45
ovember 1988

A SOVIET WEEKLY
F WORLD AFFAIRS

NEW TIMES

A myth shattered.
The lessons of the 1973
Egyptian-Israeli war



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The Soviets and government

Where the national interests of a great power lie?

Drawing by Igor Smirnov

NEW TIMES

No. 45, November 1988

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"Peace to the nations!" "Power to the Soviets!" Those were the mottoes of the October Revolution, the most important political event of the century, the 71st anniversary of which we are marking this year. The same words by Lenin keynote our perestroika, the extension of the October Revolution.

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

The Soviets and government

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

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OFF THE RECORD

Cover by
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OPINIONS

Har Shankar
Bombay, India

■ Frankly speaking, I did not understand at first why you call perestroika a revolutionary process. It seemed to me that all the reforms you were carrying out meant a revision of socialism, a departure from the glorious revolutionary traditions of your country. But having become a regular reader of your magazine, I have understood how profoundly mistaken I was. For socialism really to serve the interests of the people, it needs freedom above all. On the eve of the anniversary of the October Socialist Revolution, I wish all of you every success in your work.

Karina Ambartsumian,
architect,
Yuri Katz,
Cand. Sc. (Econ.),
Moscow

■ In issue 42/88 we read a letter from George Newman, who proposes establishing American-Soviet work and rest camps. Frankly speaking, we were pleased to see such a proposal published in your magazine, as we ourselves have long been working on a project similar to Newman's idea.

At present, it no longer seems strange to anyone that citizens of the Soviet Union and the United States are jointly holding peace marches and peace cruises along the Dnieper, Volga and Mississippi, and exchanging delegations of schoolchildren and students. The numerous public initiatives have inevitably merged with the peace moves of the Soviet and American governments.

It should be admitted, however, that till now major initiatives in the field of citizen diplomacy have come from Americans. While the Soviet government has introduced new political thinking into international relations, no political ideas have as yet come from below. It is time for us, too, to advance our proposals that would contribute to the efforts for mankind's survival.

In our opinion, life under a common roof could be the most effective means of rapprochement. For that reason we propose forming an association of Soviet and American families. How do we imagine such a community? You can find out directly from us. Our address is: Moscow 103031, Stoleshnikov Pereulok 13/15, the laboratory for feasibility study at the Moscow Design and Research Institute of Standard and Experimental Design.

Kaa Byington
San Francisco, U.S.A.

■ I've just returned from the Soviet Union. I had a splendid time and could myself feel a lot of exhilaration. But some episodes of our trip reminded me of the situation described by Alexander Pumpyanski in his article "America likes glasnost" (issue 51/87). Those who read it might remember the story of children with roses being turned away at the White House during the summit meeting. Evidently it was the janitor who threw them out. I have drawn one conclusion in your country too.

Our group, which was from a scientific museum (though few of us were scientists), talked freely with Russians from Moscow to Khabarovsk, from factory workers broiling themselves purple in the sun to scientists from the Academy of Sciences. It is interesting that one of Soviet scientists complained about high tax rates on the cooperatives, and I quoted Karl Marx, who said: "From each according to his ability." "That's communist propaganda," he said. We were both absolutely gleeful, grinning from ear to ear. But that is not the point.

Everyone, even those nitwits who tried to buy our jeans or shoes, was polite and friendly and open. (Did they really think I'd take the Metro back to my hotel in my socks and underwear?) The only exception was the coat check lady in a Moscow museum. It seemed she had never heard of glasnost or perestroika. She was the equivalent of the White House janitor. She and her soulmates, in their babushkas, ordered us around, harrassed us, intimidated us all over the Soviet Union. Don't sit down, even if your shoe lace is untied and you are about to trip. Don't open the window, even if the air-conditioning isn't working and the temperature is 100F in the train. They are mad with power, just like our museum attendants, janitors, cleaning ladies, and parking lot attendants are.

This is not a complaint, but a warning. It occurred to me that if perestroika runs aground, it will be on the babushkas. What is a fieldmarshal compared to a metre-high Ivan the Terrible in a babushka?

Boris Nesmashin
Hawthorne, Australia

■ I was born into a family that emigrated from the Soviet Union during the collectivization of agriculture. My parents first fled the country for China and then went to Australia. I have subscribed to your magazine and read it from cover to cover. Only glasnost and the free expression of different views can give hope of overcoming the difficulties that are facing your country.

The main obstacle to the success of the new policy is bureaucratism, which hampers progress in every field. Bureaucratism is manifested even in the activity of Soviet missions abroad. Dozens of countries took part in the Expo '88 "Leisure in the Age of Technology" in Brisbane. The Soviet pavilion was interesting too. But I got the impression that perestroika and glasnost, about which so much is being said and written in the Soviet Union, had no bearing on its administration. Or perhaps it had not received the appropriate instructions.

A lot of restrictions had been placed on the personnel at the Soviet pavilion, and measures of every kind had been used to protect them against "pernicious influences." Protection of adult and cultured people was carried to an absurdity. Communication between the personnel at the Soviet pavilion and local people was limited, even on days off. Soviet citizens could go in to town, on a visit in particular, only in groups of not less than three. And if one of them had a date with a girl?

In short, adult people were treated like children, though among them were noted scientists and artistes. But, while abroad, they surely wanted to see something new, to gain experience and impressions. What's bad about that? It may happen that, on returning home, they will not know exactly where they have been. Who is interested in that? In any case, it is not in the interest of perestroika and glasnost.

GLASNOST

A MATTER AT ISSUE

Matthias Klipp
Berlin, German Democratic Republic

■ There is now much talk about the need to facilitate travel from socialist countries to the West. But I think measures should first be taken to abolish restrictions and red tape connected with travel from one socialist country to another. In my opinion, visits of this kind promote friendship between people and a free exchange of ideas. That is why they are simply essential.

Unfortunately, travel opportunities for ordinary people have not increased recently. For instance, I can go to the Soviet Union only on the invitation of one of its citizens, and vice versa. Why? I have no friends in your country, though I and many of my acquaintances show great interest in it. We can learn about perestroika in the Soviet Union only from newspapers and magazines. But they cannot fully answer all questions.

A. Mumrikov
Magadan Region, U.S.S.R.

■ Reading your magazine faithfully, I have noticed that you often write about the need to build a law-governed state and about the suppression of human rights at the time of the personality cult. In issue 33/88 you published an appeal to the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet Presidium from the Public Commission for International Cooperation on Humanitarian Issues and Human Rights set up by the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation. It asks the Presidium to "re-examine the cases of the few Soviet citizens sentenced to imprisonment by people's courts for the violation of laws on freedom of conscience."

That is very good. But why has the Soviet press never published any information about the people kept in disease-prevention and labour centres where they are supposedly treated for hard drinking? Why is nothing known about the fates of thousands of these citizens put behind barbed wire and deprived of suffrage, correspondence with whom is strictly censured while treatment is virtually non-existent?

I have heard that the question of these "institutions" is to be considered. But, as far as I know, disease-prevention and labour centres of this kind will remain in the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior and this means that little, if anything, will change. The inmates of such centres need medical treatment, and they should be in the hands of doctors only.

AN ARTIST'S COMMENT



Drawing by Peep Pedmanson

CARRYING ON THE DISCUSSION

Maria Dubranova
Dnepropetrovsk, U.S.S.R.

■ In issue 35/88 I read S. O'Kelly's letter from Ireland and decided to express my opinion on the question of abolishing death penalty in our country. I am not cruel by nature. A people's assessor for many years, I have more than once wept with relatives of defendants. But what to do with a criminal accused of the cold-blooded murder of an absolutely innocent man or woman? I was present at trials that considered such cases. In my opinion, such criminals must be sentenced to death, for otherwise we shall not be rid of them for a long time.

GLASNOST

Oleg Tsvetkov
Riga, U.S.S.R.

■ Re: Leonid Ionin's article, "Rule of law is a good thing" (issue 31/88). I think the author is right on the main point: it is necessary to distinguish between civil, or political, and socio-economic rights. This is a very important point which, in my opinion, "certain ruling quarters" do not, or do not want to, understand. For instance, statements about the violation of rights in the Soviet Union, by which political rights are implied first of all the world over, are countered with the strange argument: "And you have unemployment".

Indeed, for the moment unemployment is considerably lower in our country. But that is not the point. In my opinion, the issue is being deliberately obfuscated. There are political rights and economic rights, and they should not be confused.

I can't agree with the thesis that we understand freedom in our own way, interpret human rights differently, and that therefore the world should accept us as such. That is wrong. All civilized people understand human rights and freedoms in the same way. But I agree with the author's main conclusion: "the human being needs perhaps no pie at all, but simply a breath of air, the air of freedom." I doubt if we shall achieve much without an awareness of this fact.

HIGHLIGHT OF THE WEEK

PRIVATE OPINION



ALEXANDER BRYANSKI, participant in the October Revolution

I am deeply convinced that the hopes we cherished in October 1917, when we stormed the Winter Palace, have a good deal in common with what we are seeing today. The October Revolution proclaimed "peace to the peoples" and "power to the Soviets." Haven't the same slogans been advanced now?

I am often asked how it was that only six people were killed in the course of storming the Winter Palace, where the provisional government had taken refuge. This shows the humanity and wisdom of Lenin and his close associates, who planned the seizure of power by the workers and peasants as a bloodless coup, with the fewest possible casualties.

There was an order not to begin the storming of the Winter Palace until a special signal had been given from the Neva River and the spire of the Peter-and-Paul fortress. Sailors disguised as attendants penetrated the palace, some of them through the roof, with the sole object of sustaining as few losses as possible. One soldier cried: "What are we waiting for? Forward!" Only five violated the order and ran after him. Some of them were killed.

Today we are restoring Leninist traditions, the concept of socialism as Lenin understood it. The renewal of society and the country as a whole is proceeding in accordance with Lenin's ideas, which are again winning support the world over.



KLAUS LIEDTKE, Editor-in-Chief, the magazine Stern (F.R.G.)

Journalists from the countries that participated in the Helsinki Conference recently gathered in Moscow to discuss their vision of "an all-European home," and their attitudes to each other. Journalists certainly have a major part to play in "an all-European home," informing its inhabitants of everything that promotes contacts between nations.

The prerequisites for reasonable cooperation between journalists of the two military and political blocs could be created by the Soviet Union's measures to ensure a free flow of information from East to West and vice versa. Until we are sure that all parties have equal access to information, obstacles in the way of cooperation will remain. I look on with great pleasure as Soviet journalism emerges from stagnation, becoming more and more interesting, and tackling subjects that seemed taboo only a few years ago.

Stern has made no small contribution to relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union. Twenty years ago it began to campaign for Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik. Today, too, it stresses the need for compromise in bilateral relations.



VYACHESLAV GLAZYCHEV, architect, Chairman of the Organizing Committee of Memorial, a national voluntary historical and educational society

The founding conference of the Memorial Society is to be held in Moscow at the end of this year. The charter of the organization was drafted at a preliminary meeting on October 29 and 30, and we would like it to be published and discussed thoroughly. It will be then clear to everyone that Memorial has no ulterior motives and is not a group of conspirators seeking to depict our history exclusively in sombre hues.

Besides erecting monuments to the victims of repression, Memorial will study the events relating to that dismal period in our history. At the focus of our attention should be the fate of people, both known and unknown. We want to set up archives, a museum and a library. There is not a single town or village where Stalinism has not left its sinister trace. The memory of those days should not be obliterated from people's minds.



SVYATOSLAV FYODOROV, corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.

The Eye Microsurgery Research Complex, the Bank for Foreign Economic Affairs of the U.S.S.R., the French companies Bouygues and Pullman International, and four French banks have concluded an agreement on the construction of the joint venture Iris for the treatment of eye diseases on a commercial basis. This is both useful and advantageous for the two countries. Patients from France and other countries will be able to get the necessary treatment in Moscow. For this purpose a modern 250-bed hotel and medical complex is to be built by the summer of 1990. It will also have restaurants, shops, a rehabilitation centre, and living and working premises for the firms involved in the project.

Nor will Soviet people lose out. As we are going to treat wealthy people, payment for our work will be fairly high and in hard currency. With the money earned, we shall be able to buy abroad badly needed medicines and up-to-date instruments. Experience will show whether our cooperation is successful or not. In the meantime, Iris is planning to build a number of new medical centres – on the Canary Islands, in Kuwait, Cyprus, to name a few.

It can be said that Iris is opening up a new era in the development of Soviet health services by organizing the delivery of up-to-date Soviet technology to different parts of the world.

HAS THE KOMSOMOL LIVED UP TO ITS NAME?

At the First All-Russian Congress of Young Workers' and Peasants' Leagues, from which the Soviet Komsomol traces its 70-year-old history, delegates told Lenin that they had decided to call their association the Young Communist League. Lenin retorted that what was in question was not a name. However, when the delegates assured him that they would live up to this name, he said that that was quite a different matter and that it would be a very good thing.

As one pauses to reflect on these words of Lenin, one feels that all his wisdom and perspicacity was condensed into that observation that it "would be a very good thing." After all, he didn't say that the adoption of the name was a good thing. What he meant was that it would be a good thing if the younger generation were to live up to the name.

Have they done so? This question is being put today in the process of perestroika by both members of the Komsomol and by experience-wise Party stalwarts. Though they believe there is much to bear this out, they also note that there is much that indicates the reverse. No wonder we hear such heated debates raging in and around the Komsomol, debates characterized by the spirit of democracy and glasnost. Though the Soviet Komsomol fully deserves its six high government decorations, at the same time one cannot overlook the red tape and career-seeking so unnatural in young people, the unthinking conformism that replaces day-to-day solicitude for material and intellectual requirements and, last but not least, the mass movements inspired from above, which, as it later transpired, went nowhere. There is a lot on the account that perestroika is presenting to the Komsomol, a harsh reckoning, the more so as members of the Komsomol have qualified this in a spirit of self-criticism as "a crisis of confidence," with which the YCL has yet to cope.

The 70th anniversary of the Komsomol, the popularly accepted acronym for the Leninist Young Communist League of the Soviet Union, to give it its full title, coincides with the 71st anniversary of the October 1917 revolution. No wonder the meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and young people of Moscow and its environs, was coloured, as it were, by the red hues of the revolution that the Soviet

At the meeting of Mikhail Gorbachev with young people of Moscow and its environs. *TASS photo*

people are continuing today in the form of perestroika.

The Komsomol has always shared the nation's destiny, Mikhail Gorbachev said. He went on to note that the Soviet people could pride themselves on this meaningful destiny. Yet at the same time, he added, there was much in Soviet history that was disturbing. The Soviet people, he emphasized, looked back on the last 70 years with pride, as these years had been pervaded by the struggle to implement the ideas of the revolution, even though this struggle had been weighed down by tragic events.

The dialectic is simple. Virtually every Soviet citizen has been or is being schooled in the Komsomol. Many generations have matured in its ranks, which is why society is largely what the Komsomol has made it, with all its merits and demerits. The fact that today the Soviet people are so boldly carrying forward the ideas of the October revolution in perestroika shows that, on the one hand, they are in their way atoning for what they either failed to do, or did wrongly, and that, on the other hand, they are optimistically drawing on the truly inexhaustible reserves of energy which they failed fully to utilize in such a way as to justify completely the name of Young Communist League.

No doubt that is how one should understand the mass movement that perestroika has generated, especially among the younger generation, a movement expressed in the numerous informal associations that they have organized. These informal associations serve to make good the losses red tape has brought about in the Komsomol's affairs. In these informal associations young people, members of the Komsomol or otherwise, find an outlet for their social, moral and cultural urges awakened by the general spirit of renascence. Like the political school it is, the Komsomol naturally seeks to channel this awakened energy into the consolidation of perestroika, a real continuation of the October revolution.

Writer Vera Ketlinskaya, a delegate to the Komsomol's Eighth Congress, most aptly described this when she stressed the absolute need for that spirit of continuity, which should be shared alike by veterans of the revolution and especially by the younger generation, inasmuch as, whatever might fill their heads, they are of Soviet stock. They would only be despoiling themselves of their own wealth, she observed, were they not to appreciate what they had inherited and what they were to carry forward, improve upon, and fill with a new and modern content.

Today, as it celebrates its 70th anniversary, the Komsomol, along with all of Soviet Youth, report to Lenin, as it were,

the responsible choice they are making. What will they take with them when they go forward to pioneer new paths? What will they jettison as unnecessary? The countrywide rally of political youth clubs held to mark the 70th anniversary has provided some of the answers.

Add to that the innovations that the Komsomol has come up with in its effort to regain what has been lost and to evolve promising forms of youth association, as the competitive election of its secretaries at district and city committee level, the social invention fund, the associations of young economic executives, the youth housing complexes, the movement launched by young contract farmers to repopulate deserted villages and so on.

Only recently the concern shown by the Party for the younger generation was by and large more in the way of an ideological tradition than social pragmatism. The situation has now changed drastically. If we look at the sum of the substance of perestroika, we may take this as a truly historical option offered to the younger generation, to the Komsomol, to display their prowess as true masters of the country in the democratic process. After all, it is for the younger generation to consummate perestroika, plough the virgin land of the socialist remaking of society. This is indeed, both an inspiring and a responsible goal which, while intolerant of too much fuss or haste, does call for the audacity and imagination of youthful minds.

Shortly before the Komsomol anniversary, some activists voiced concern that though there was a political youth organization, there was still no concept of a youth policy. Allow me to object. In the first place, this concept is set out in the speech which Lenin addressed the Komsomol's Third Congress. In the second place, Lenin's behests to the younger generation have now been carried forward by Mikhail Gorbachev at the meeting with Moscow youth mentioned earlier to suit the new phase of perestroika.

Mikhail Gorbachev's speech is more than just an exchange of views with the perestroika's junior partner. It is also a programme showing the Komsomol and the entire younger generation what they can actually do to implement perestroika, inasmuch, as was emphasized, policies, meetings, assessments, slogans, and criticisms must necessarily be followed up by action to translate the policies and slogans into reality, and provide a broad field for society's potential.

"Perestroika will win out and achieve its goals only if adopted by the younger generation," these words of General Secretary Gorbachev reveal the scale of the confidence and trust reposed in the younger generation and the YCL. The above-mentioned meeting, which took place at the Moscow's Palace of Youth has conclusively demonstrated that the younger generation have welcomed perestroika as their goal in life. Though the obstacles are still there, the necessary machinery that can be drawn upon to advance has already been created. The range of issues stressed, the divergence of views are only natural and, indeed, inevitable. All this has to be squarely faced so that the effort initiated be brought to a successful conclusion. In this process the younger generation will display its civic maturity.

This invocation rang out at the meeting. After all, during the period of stagnation it was not just the economy that suffered. Convictions, faith in the attainment of the objectives declared, confidence in the Party and socialism, were all afflicted. These doubts infiltrated the consciousness of the younger generation and were reflected in their movements. Matters went so far that the young people of the 1960s and 1970s were sometimes described as "a lost generation." That, however, was an exaggeration, I think, inasmuch as despite the full seriousness of the aberrations that had set in, they had not plunged Soviet society into a hopeless condition, had not undercut the pillars of socialist ideology and the socialist way of life. The fact that perestroika has been so heartily acclaimed by the entire people, the younger generation included, shows that the socialist idea is alive, that all Soviet generations have preserved their devotion to the ideas of the October revolution, and retained their faith in socialism.

Today, when summoning the younger generation to contribute boldly to perestroika, the Party simultaneously warns that at times of drastic change there are bound to be people who, playing upon the entirely logical common urge to achieve their goals sooner, issue what would outwardly appear to be radical calls, but which are erroneous at their very source. Hence the younger generation, with all its vigor and appreciation of everything that is revolutionary, must know how to choose between what is really revolutionary and what is only a pseudorevolutionary parody. The unerring guidelines for all, and especially for the younger generation, is furnished by the realistic theory and policy of perestroika that the CPSU has drafted. This is our first paramount victory which it behoves us all to carry forward.

The Young Communist League is primarily an association of young Communists, who espouse the Party's programme, seek to cooperate with it in tackling political objectives, and gear the younger generation to shoulder the responsibility for society and the continuation of revolutionary policy. The Party welcomes the Komsomol's renascence on the basis of Leninist principles as the political organization of the Soviet younger generation.

Perestroika and democratization create for the Komsomol new conditions from the angle of the law, and enable it to display full independence. Soon these options will be still further elaborated upon in the youth bill currently being drafted. However, it must be noted that even the most democratic rights and liberties are always accompanied by civic responsibility and awareness. Today the Party offers this concept of word and deed to its helper and reserve, the Leninist Komsomol, exhorting it to further the revolutionary process of perestroika as the direct continuation of Lenin's cause and the ideas of the October revolution.

More than ever before today's younger generation represents a militant, truly revolutionary, political factor. The Party and Soviet society confidently look to the creative potential of the young in the effort to carry out the grandiose plans for the remaking of society. Now that perestroika is placing more and more issues on the agenda with every passing day, the Party is urging the Komsomol, and the younger generation generally, not to be daunted by the innovative complexity of revolutionary change, insofar as they possess that basic asset, the legacy bequeathed by Lenin and the genuine interest in this legacy which is to be observed today amongst young people, especially those in the Komsomol. Perestroika summons the young to learn the method, dialectics, and approach that Lenin displayed in his analysis of the processes at work in society.

May I in this connection quote Lenin once again. "We," he said, "are the Party of the future, and the future belongs to the youth. We are a party of innovators, and it is always the youth that most eagerly follows the innovators. We are a party that is waging a self-sacrificing struggle against the old rottenness, and youth is always the first to undertake a self-sacrificing struggle."

Lenin might almost have said that today.

Vitaly Ganyushkin

QUOTATIONS

Najibullah,
President of
the Republic
of Afghanistan

■ Our sole aim is to restore peace and national concord. To this end we have made compromises and renounced our monopoly on power. In particular, the government has even left a number of areas to the opposition forces. Our troops have withdrawn from 24 areas in order to ensure peace and the safe return of refugees. It is not an indication of weakness on the part of the government, but proof of the fact that it is aware of its responsibility to the people.

T. Khasbator,
literary critic,
Mongolia

■ We know that the wave of Stalin repressions also shook Mongolia. In the 1930s the finest representatives of the emergent revolutionary intelligentsia were labelled "enemies," and unlawfully arrested and shot.

In those years the situation was in the hands of conceited and shortsighted people who, using revolutionary phraseology as a cover, had established a regime of terror and, under the slogan of the struggle against feudalism, wrecked historical monuments and treasures of national culture.

It was a great common tragedy. Nevertheless, writers praised Stalin and Choibalsan to the skies. Though many years have passed since then, our literature has not yet been able to tell the people convincingly about the sacrifice and grief of thousands of innocent victims.

A unique person... he knows the abominable snowman, has travelled on flying saucers, and has now devised a machine to detect bugging devices installed in our Embassy in Moscow.

Drawing by Vsevolod Arsenyev

Sir Geoffrey Howe,
Foreign
Secretary,
Great
Britain

■ We are certainly not rushing in pouring money into the Soviet economy. We are not making money available from the taxpayer to the Soviet economy at all, because ... too much of their money goes on arms expenditure and we are not propping up a communist military society, but it is moving in the direction of a less militarily-directed, more commercially-sensible pattern of economic growth and development, trying to shuffle away from all the nonsenses of communism, and we are willing to take part in that, to our advantage as well as theirs. At the same time, we are going to keep up the pressure for arms control, for arms reduction, and that is the strongest part of our message.

We are not rushing in pouring money down their throat. We are seeking for good business opportunities at the same time as pressing them to change their system...

Michel Rocard,
Premier,
France

■ There is now, since Gorbachev and the INF Euromissile treaty, a new situation in which there is a demand for conventional disarmament, and therefore a demand for the participation of European countries in the process. This has created an open situation, in which we can begin to work on some more solidarity in the way we speak about defence. We are facing the double necessity of entering the arms control process, and of increasing our European capacity to uphold our part in a balanced alliance with the United States.

In terms of defence, we are ridiculous. Three hundred million Europeans are praying to be defended by 230 million Americans from 280 million Soviets, whose standard of living would not lead one to suppose that they are better than we are.

Charles Redman,
State Department
spokesman, U.S.A.

■ The United States believes that any country that wants to host a CSCE meeting should have a credible record of compliance with CSCE commitments on the subjects to be discussed. They should also provide the kind of access and openness which has traditionally been extended to the public and media at CSCE meetings in the past.

The ball is now in Washington's court

Victor Starodubov,
Lieutenant-General

Is there cause for suspicion?

For over fifteen years, the ABM treaty faithfully served the cause of peace and the arms limitation process, causing no doubts either from Moscow, Washington or anyone else as to the indispensability and the unquestionable character of all its provisions.

In accordance with Clause 14, the treaty is subject to discussion once every five years. In the 1977 communiqué on the results of the first discussion of the treaty, the sides reaffirmed their resolve to uphold and strengthen the viability and effectiveness of the treaty.

Five years later, the communiqué on the second discussion of the treaty was more modest, but in it the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. reiterated their commitment to the aims and objectives of the treaty. The restrained tone of the communiqué had a simple explanation, as in 1981 the United States had adopted an overall programme of American rearmament which, along with the buildup and development of other weapons, also provided for the creation of offensive space weapons.

The next discussion of the treaty was to have been held in 1987, but at the request of the U.S. side the meeting was postponed, and did not take place until August 1988.

This request was not unexpected, as in 1983 the United States had adopted the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). Its main objective in space runs counter to the principal provision of the ABM treaty, namely the ban on deploying ABM systems over the territory of one's country or even creating a basis for this kind of defence.

It is no wonder that during the third discussion of the ABM treaty in August of this year, the U.S. delegates refused to sign joint communiqué reiterating the commitment on the part of the Soviet Union and the United States to the aims and objectives of the treaty.

Now Washington is facing the dilemma of abandoning either SDI or the ABM treaty. The present U.S. administration will not even listen to the repudiating of SDI. However, nor does it wish to renege flagrantly on the ABM treaty. This would augur major political problems. Therefore they have opted for a third way, that is, to pave the way for the abandonment of the treaty, blaming the partner for the violation of the commitments imposed by it.

The accusation centres on the building in the U.S.S.R. of the radar station near Krasnoyarsk. Spokesmen of the U.S. administration claim that the radar is designed to warn of a missile attack from the northwest. And if so, then, in accordance with the ABM treaty, it must be deployed only on the periphery of its national territory with an outward orientation.

All this would have been all right if the radar project were indeed a warning station. But it has been designed, however, as a radar station to monitor outer space, and this type of radar station is not banned by the treaty. In this case, then, there is no cause for recriminations, the more so as construction on the project has been suspended.

There is another count. American national monitoring facilities once discovered an object near Gomel which the U.S. representatives qualified as evidence that the Soviet Union was building mobile ABM radars which were probably to be deployed in the area banned by the treaty.

Indeed, there were some elements of antiquated radars of the Pawn Shop or Flat Twin type (using American terminology). Three Pawn Shops and one Flat Twin were once sited on the Sary-Shagan proving ground. These were not ABM radars. The Americans were told that all three Pawn Shop radars had been dismantled and their hardware had been demolished. Two vans for these radars had been handed over for the needs of the economy, one is now near Gomel, the other near Moscow. As for the third, it had been destroyed on site. The Flat Twin radar elements, including an aerial turntable and empty containers, were also delivered to the Gomel area. All these operations are performed in compliance with the ABM treaty.

To eliminate any doubts, as a gesture of good will, the Soviet side invited a U.S. delegation to visit the areas near Gomel and Moscow. The visit took place late last December, and the issue seemed to have been settled. But complaints resumed at the end of March 1988.

The Soviet government statement of October 27 once again confirmed the proposal advanced by Mikhail Gorbachev on September 16, 1988, to set up on the basis of the Krasnoyarsk radar an international cooperation centre for the use of outer space for peaceful purposes. It could be integrated into the system of the World Space Organization. As a first step in this direction the Soviet government has decided to hand the Krasnoyarsk radar over to the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences. At the same time, it has expressed its readiness to discuss with the United States and other nations concerned practical steps needed for the implementation of this idea.

As for the Pawn Shop and Flat Twin radar elements, in order to eliminate any "anxiety," the Soviet Union has expressed its readiness to destroy them.

Now the ball is in the court of Washington, in whose address we have serious and well-founded complaints. The Soviet government's statement says: the U.S.S.R. expects the U.S. to take measures to eliminate its concern with regard to the violation of the ABM treaty resulting from the deployment by the U.S. of a phased array radar in Greenland and from the building of a similar radar in Britain.

The question of preserving the ABM treaty is important in itself. But it is even more important for the future of the present statutory negotiation system. The preservation of the ABM treaty will help to secure the basis for arms limitation, primarily strategic arms. Without the treaty, such bases would disappear as well. That is why in the statement of October 27, 1988, the Soviet government once again spoke in favour of securing and strengthening the ABM treaty and a strict and responsible approach to the observance of all its provisions as expressed at the time of its signing in 1972.

"As partners and potential friends"

"Ice is broken..." "A new chapter..." "A historic landmark..." We have by now come to take these highfaluting phrases with a pinch of salt. In the context of the U.S.S.R.– F.R.G., however, they describe the gist of the current changes accurately enough.

The results of the Soviet-West German summit are indeed substantial. The summit promoted a dialogue between the leaders of the two countries and gave it a new political dimension that opens up broader prospects. Informal personal contact was established, making possible a meaningful and candid discussion of complex and delicate issues.

Obstacles negotiated

The parties to the talks had every reason to say that the most difficult obstacles in the way of bilateral relations were negotiated. They have had their ups and downs. There have been wise, forward-looking and cardinal moves like the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1955-56 and the signing of the Moscow Treaty in 1970. But many opportunities for the constructive development of relations have been missed.

As they are now summing up the nearly forty-year period of their relationships, Moscow and Bonn can draw on the long and instructive record of the mutual losses and gains it has witnessed. This is actually the purpose of the political document now in the making – a document of fundamental conceptual significance – which is to lay down the basic parameters and prospects of interaction between the two countries in international affairs and of their cooperation in all spheres of activity. It is expected to be signed during Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to the F.R.G. in the first half of next year.

Big-time politics cannot neglect public sentiments. The visit of West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl to Moscow has shown that the leaders of the two countries are aware of the profound moral and psychological dimension to Soviet-West German relations. Are we still adversaries, after all that has been said and done and achieved in our relations?

"Let us try and look upon each other not as two former enemies or two potential adversaries, but as partners and potential friends," Moscow suggested. Bonn noted rightaway that previously friendship had been reserved by us exclusively for the other German state.

Indeed, it was precisely the G.D.R. that did its utmost to put the Germans back in the other nations' good books. By its unqualified break with the traditions of German militarism, by its honest promotion of peace ideals, by its consistent anti-fascism and humanism, the socialist German state made a crucial contribution towards a new Europe – a Europe of good-neighbourliness.

An invitation was extended to establish friendly relations, abandon the fetters of confrontation and proceed to build a common European home according to the criteria of good-neighbourliness and new political thinking. This is the key to the problem which appears important to Chancellor Kohl, and which is "to draw the hearts and minds of the people closer together."

Open partnership

There are many dimensions to that partnership, and they were discussed during the talks in the Kremlin. Some of the initiatives advanced have already been spelt out in clear-cut agreements on cooperation over wide-ranging areas – economic, scientific, technological, ecological, and humanitarian.

The F.R.G. is our leading trading partner among capitalist states. It is also the leading partner in the joint ventures recently launched. Chancellor Kohl proclaimed his commitment to the further progress of extensive business cooperation, to the European community becoming an open partner of its socialist neighbours. The Chancellor proposed among other things a three-year programme of annual spells of fieldwork in the F.R.G. for more than a thousand of Soviet specialists. At the moment only four Soviet students are studying economics in the F.R.G. as compared with three thousand Chinese students.

The signs are that the Federal Republic has abandoned

Representatives of the Minsk Machine-Tool Amalgamation and the F.R.G.'s Heinemann Company signing a joint venture contract.

TASS photo

the primitive notion that economic deals play into the hands of the adversary and that "subsidizing perestroika in the Soviet Union" is tantamount to digging one's own grave. There is an awareness now that this is an investment in the future and in economic stability. The West German government has made a notable, if not decisive contribution to establishing relations between the EEC and CMEA. It is only natural to expect of it more efforts to do away with all that stands in the way of normal economic cooperation between East and West. There is a growing trend among business and political circles in the F.R.G. in favour of abandoning odious bans and discriminatory sanctions against the East.

Many observers have been impressed by the scale of the joint projects and agreements signed in Moscow. They reflect the huge potential at the disposal of the two countries.

How to achieve security

New thinking has taken a firm root in the area of peaceful cooperation, where its potential is most obvious. It is much harder to maintain relations in the highly sensitive area of security, discussed at length and in great detail in Moscow.

Speaking in a newspaper interview a year ago, Chancellor Kohl complained: "No other country across the world has so many weapons stockpiled in such a small space. No other country bears such a burden."

Understandably, that is a major concern for the West German public. It is also true that the concentration of troops and weapons – of the F.R.G. itself and other countries – on that scale in the F.R.G. is also of major concern to other European nations. If Soviet military power and the power of the Warsaw Treaty Organization – despite the fact that the Western Germans' fear of a Soviet invasion has diminished sharply, judging by public opinion polls – is regarded as an "objective threat," the same applies to NATO "mailed fist" on the West German soil. F.R.G. Defence Minister Rupert Scholz said prior to his visit to Moscow that his country does not envisage the possibility of a Soviet attack on Western Europe, although it cannot but take the existing realities into account – huge military potential and the possibilities it affords. One cannot turn a blind eye, however, to the present level of West German armaments or the plans to build them up either on their own, or with their NATO partners' assistance.

The implementation of the Soviet-American INF treaty has reduced the burden mentioned by the West German Chancellor. The F.R.G. government has extended a great deal of support for the treaty. One must pay tribute to the political courage the Chancellor displayed when tackling the problems which had arisen at one time. He went on record as saying that there is a good chance now to achieve more security with less weapons, i.e., the "third zero option" – the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

The Federal Republic has an important role to play here. An economic giant, it is no longer the political dwarf it used to be, but its vote in NATO could be a much weightier one. In that case, the slogan of "a world with less weapons" would go a longer way to becoming a reality.

Today's situation in Europe and the world at large calls for political common sense, courage, and entirely new approaches.

Clearly, West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher perceives Soviet perestroika and the current improvement of Soviet-American relations as a historic chance to improve East-West relations as a whole. He believes that East and West should cooperate in working out a security policy aimed at ruling out war. That is a lofty goal and we must make progress towards it by refraining from strengthening our military muscles.

Some analysts have complained about Moscow's "tough stand" on the "Berlin" and "German" questions. But the case in point, really, is recognition of today's realities. Political realism is incompatible with a loose and biased interpretation of acting agreements. Let history judge, for unrealistic projects have no chance.

It is highly significant that Soviet-West German relations are advancing with due consideration for their implications for Europe and the world at large, and awareness of the great service that we can do this closely-knit world acting in its best interests. Real progress in these relations directly depends on how confident the international community is of its future.

The trend toward a more orderly world situation and better international relations has been promoted by the Moscow summit between Mikhail Gorbachev and Helmut Kohl.

Vladlen Kuznetsov

Sixteen installations in the Yemen Arab Republic bear plaques saying: "Built by the Soviet Union and Yemen." It all began with trade sixty years ago...

Russian goods appeared in Yemen after the young Soviet Republic had signed one of its first friendship and cooperation agreements – that with Imam Yahya, the King of Yemen.

The background of the agreement was as follows. After the Ottoman Empire had disintegrated and been shared out, the northern part of Yemen managed to uphold its independence, while its southern part remained a British colony and protectorate.

Imam Yahya, the religious leader of the Zaidi sect, became king of independent Yemen. An intractable person, he didn't get on with the powers that were, Britain above all. Anxious to revive a united great Yemen, he did not recognize the British domination over the southern part of the country. He suppressed the separatist tendencies shown by some of his kingdom's tribes and rallied them to the fight for the liberation of the south from British domination. But the odds were obviously not in his favour, and in 1928 the British drove the Imam's troops away from the southern territories.

It was then that Yahya approached the Soviet consul in Saudi Arabia with a proposal that friendly relations be established between northern Yemen and the Soviet Union. The Soviet-Yemeni Friendship and Trade Agreement was signed in San'a, the capital of Yemen, on November 1, 1928.

Here are some statistics pertaining to those now long gone times. In the early thirties the Soviet Union accounted for 75 per cent of the kerosene, 50 per cent of the sugar and 40 per cent of the matches Yemen imported and supplied practically all the cement Yemen needed. A group of Soviet physicians was sent to that country.

The Yemenis who accompanied me on my recent tour of the country were pointedly matter-of-fact as they explained: "We are now riding along a highway built with the assistance of the Soviet Union..." Or: "This highway runs to the port of Hodeida built with the help of the U.S.S.R." Or, near Hodeida: "This cement plant has been built with the assistance of the Soviet Union..."

The highway was mirror-smooth. The port functioned without a hitch, although

The twain shall meet

it needed expansion. The cement plant worked full blast while new blocks were being added to it: demand for building materials had increased sharply over the past few years (a good sign). The plant was still run by Soviet engineers, but local personnel, trained right on the spot, was already prepared to take over.

The President

President Ali Abdullah Saleh of the Yemen Arab Republic systematically tours the country, visits the villages of various tribes, follows the progress of this or that construction project, steps in to prevent conflicts from coming to a head, and addresses army units. The importance of such trips and get-togethers with tribes (of which there are nearly 170 in Yemen) can be judged by the fact that once chronic frictions and conflicts have long ceased.

It is precisely under this vigorous and youngish president that Yemen has achieved domestic peace for the first time in its history. Intertribal strife and internecine wars have come to an end. Says the President: "Islam is the state religion in the Yemen Arab Republic, party pluralism does not suit us, and we shall not accept a different political structure... We have borrowed from capitalism and socialism what we need economically and what does not contradict the Islamic religion socially."

Besides serving its direct purpose, a Yemeni marketplace offers representatives of various tribes a venue for communication.

The creation of a good road network and efficient telephone communication system has gone a long way towards the establishment of domestic peace. No tribe is cut off from the rest of the nation any longer. A unique parliament – the General National Congress comprising 24,000 members - has been set up. No government resolution is adopted without the consent of this enormous parliament in which all the tribes are represented. Now it is possible to settle any conflict by telephone or on the spot – any tribe can be easily reached by road.

As far as its foreign policy is concerned, Yemen remains an active member of the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Conference and other regional and international communities. The country invariably supports the right cause of the Arab people of Palestine and insists on a fair settlement in the Middle East. In this connection the leadership of the republic attaches special importance to the further strengthening of friendly relations with the Soviet Union. "The Soviet Union is a friend of ours," President Saleh stresses in his statements. "It has given us a helping hand right after the revolution, supported us economically and promoted the strengthening of our defence capacity. This enabled us to hold out, especially in the seventies when the enemies tried to deal a blow on the Yemeni revolution."

From quarrel to cooperation

The fact that the North and South have failed to get along from the very beginning seems strange – inexplicable even.

The situation was rather awkward in 1968-69. I was a TASS correspondent in Aden then. The British had just left their onetime colony. The former sultans and emirs fled from southern Yemen, some of them moved to the North. The country went progressive but couldn't go too far owing to a catastrophic lack of money. It was then that systematic armed border clashes between North and South began.

South Yemeni papers put all the blame on Northern Yemen: the reactionary forces which had entrenched themselves there sought to overthrow the democratic system of government in the South.

In turn, Northern Yemen accused the "southern brother" of aggressiveness. The awkwardness of it was that the Soviet Union vigorously promoted friendship and cooperation with both neighbours and rendered assistance to either. Our military advisers worked in the North and the South alike.

It became clear with time, however, that there was nothing awkward about that, really. Nobody reproached us, either in the South or in the North, of collaborating with the "enemy." On the contrary, our friendship with both the South and the North was the only connecting link between the brothers who had failed to find a common language, and offered a hope of the ultimate settlement.

The striking of oil in the border area between the Yemen Arab Republic and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, between Marib in the North and Shabwa in the South threatened further aggravation of the conflict. Oil has often been the apple of discord in many parts of the world. Indeed, the relations between the two neighbours grew extremely strained again in November 1987, even to the point of shooting.

Common sense prevailed on both sides in the end – an oil war is a dangerous thing. Such conflicts promptly develop into international ones. 1988 has become a peace year for the whole of Yemen. The leaders of the P.D.R.Y. and of the YAR met last May and decided to resolve the problem once and for all. Instead of fighting over their common mineral wealth, they decided to cooperate in tapping it. They even agreed on opening the border between the two states.

It looks as if all such misunderstandings are on their way out. For all we can tell, Great Yemen may be just around the corner. The reunification of the two fraternal states would benefit the people of Yemen, above all.

Dmitry Zgersky

Minimum divisions

The contenders are vying for public sympathy – the main prize of the race at the moment...

An American journalist I know remarked that if locked into a room together, the two presidential candidates would arrive, within hours, at a common programme on all aspects of home and foreign policy.

This might be an overstatement, but in fact the political programmes Bush and Dukakis have been airing over the past few days are largely at variance with those submitted to the national conventions, let alone earlier versions. Differences have been reduced to a minimum. For instance, Dukakis' approach to the defence issue has become somewhat more bellicose, while Bush's stand on "star wars" is not quite as tough as it used to be.

Under the circumstances, voters' personal likes and dislikes may have the decisive role to play. Charisma was definitely what both Bush and Dukakis lack in their "contest of personalities." Bush affects cool politeness in public. Dukakis looks more of an extrovert but, according to one American paper, he produces the impression of a person who'd rather peruse statistical reports or chat with a computer than address huge audiences. Both candidates have been reproached with not being much good at wisecracking, smiling, and posing as "good guys."

In the current election campaign each candidate is entitled to spend up to 30 million dollars on TV publicity. In projecting the image he wants, either candidate can use the services of experts, journalists, psychologists, stage directors, designers, fashion stylists, and hairdressers, who also compete with their opposite numbers in the other camp – only offstage.

Nevertheless, I have the impression that most of the "image building" is being done by the candidates themselves, members of their families, and their closest aides. Inter-



Both the Democrats and the Republicans are inflating their candidates' images.
Cartoon from the Economist (Britain)

For the first time in 40 years, the United States has come through a presidential election campaign in which the military threat from the Soviet Union did not figure as a major issue.

Test of sincerity

That testifies to the changed nature of the superpower relationship in the 11 months since President Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev signed a treaty to eliminate intermediate- and shorter-range nuclear weapons. The spirit of cooperation engendered by the treaty was carried forward at the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Moscow last spring, which, in terms of symbolism and atmospherics, if not so much of substance, was a highly successful meeting.

It also has spilled over into other areas of the world. For example, the Sino-Soviet summit that is expected to take place next year may come about because of other considerations, but the removal of 100 Soviet SS 20 missiles from Asia under terms of the treaty no doubt has contributed to an improved outlook in relations between the two countries.

But it may be premature to draw sweeping conclusions as to the effects of the INF treaty.

Hopes for a treaty to reduce Soviet and American strategic arsenals by 50 per cent before the end of President Reagan's term, which were voiced after the signing of the INF treaty, will not be realized, and the two superpowers still confront each other with awesome military power.

The suspicions and antagonisms of the past may have become attenuated, but they have not disappeared. Reagan's proposed strategic defence initiative remains a contentious issue between the two countries, as does the question of what to do about sea-launched cruise missiles.

As elements in a strategic arms agreement, these are far more important issues than those involved in the negotiations on an INF treaty. The signing of the INF treaty was more an act of political symbolism than of military significance. But a strategic arms agreement, dealing with questions more central to national survival, goes to the heart of the superpower relationship.

With the strategic arms negotiations now marking time until a new American administration is installed, attention has shifted to the upcoming talks on conventional forces in Europe as a forum that can provide an important test of Soviet intentions, in the view of Western officials.

viewed shortly after the Republican convention in New Orleans, George Bush dwelt, in his usual confident manner, on various aspects of U.S. home and foreign policy, and emphasized the administration's successes in the international arena, specifically in the sphere of Soviet-American relations. Having heard him out, the interviewer asked Barbara Bush what she most appreciated about her husband. "His sense of humour and his unpretentiousness," Mrs Bush replied, without a moment's hesitation. Suddenly America discovered another Bush, which proved more to its liking. Before very long, television companies had added to their various commercials brief political ones showing Bush in his family circle; Bush with his granddaughter; Bush with his son's adopted daughter...

The Democratic candidate's team has not been found marking time either: Dukakis appears on the silver screen now and again playing baseball, kicking a ball around in the company of young black boys...

Clips have appeared which are intended by the rival teams to cut each other to the quick. The Democrats have reportedly been hurt most by a clip showing Dukakis riding on a new tank, to the accompaniment of critical remarks levelled against the current administraton's militarism. The Dukakis team responded with a skit, performed by professional actors, on the discussion of Dan Quayle's vice-presidential candidacy at Bush's headquarters. That was something unprecendented in the history of political bickering. The skit gave viewers the impression that it was only an incompetent like George Bush who could have selected such an unpopular person as running mate.

The Wall Street Journal believes, however, that so far the Vice-President has drawn the highest dividends on his investment in the TV publicity campaign. Judging from the returns of public opinion polls, however, the candidates' popularity depends on many factors other than successes in the "clip war." Although Bush's and Dukakis' predecessors also used television in their preelection rivalry, the current election campaign is referred to as a television one. There have been serious reasons for using television in this campaign on such a large scale. The votes of residents of small towns and farms in the Midwest, on the whole, may decide the outcome of the election. This category of the electorate has no consistent political orientation and may cast its vote for any candidate who succeeds in "turning it on."

It is a physical impossibility to tour all these small towns, and farms located in several states. So the candidates have to content themselves with addressing voters on television, right in their homes, between films, pop concerts and baseball games.

Electioneering culminated in a face-to-face verbal duel in front of TV cameras. Although Dukakis looked more businesslike than his rival, Bush was voted the winner in public opinion polls.

Recently, television showed the latest from the Republican admen: a photograph of Mikhail Gorbachev shaking hands with Bush in Washington last December with a caption that went: "Who can look Gorbachev full in the face?"

Evgeny Andrianov

New York

The U.S. presidential election race, now in its home stretch, commented upon by our own correspondent and his American colleague.

American experts start with the premise that Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces heavily outnumber those of the West in Europe and go on to argue that Soviet willingness to correct the military balance not only will test the commitment of the Soviet leadership to a reduction of tensions in the world but also the seriousness of its economic reforms.

Without a reduction in Soviet military spending, they contend, these reforms have no hope of succeeding.

Little of this discussion among the experts was reflected in the presidential campaign between Republican George Bush and Democrat Michael Dukakis. Both candidates gave relatively little attention to foreign policy issues generally and they all but ignored the question of how to deal with the Soviet Union except within the framework of their respective arms policies.

The discussion on arms turned on the question of which candidate could demonstrate the stronger commitment to defence spending. This no doubt reflected the fact that most Americans still do not trust the Soviet Union sufficiently to want to see a reduction in military preparedness programmes.

In general, there is a greater cautiousness in the U.S. toward developments in the Soviet Union than is to be found among U.S. allies in Western Europe and Japan. The cautiousness arises from doubts as to the likely success of perestroika, wariness about the ability of the West to influence what is happening in the Soviet Union and suspicions about Soviet intentions.

There is no great enthusiasm in the U.S., as there is abroad, for becoming involved in financing perestroika. U.S. experts tend to believe that the Soviet Union has not gone far enough in reforming its economic system to make perestroika work, and therefore they argue that any assistance could be wasted.

But European and Japanese banks have come forward with financial credits to the Soviet Union totalling more than 8 billion dollars. U.S. officials believe some governments have encouraged banks to give these loans primarily for political reasons, to help the U.S.S.R. succeed with its reforms.

Some U.S. officials worry that the U.S.S.R.'s recent moves in the international arena are designed to weaken ties between the U.S. and its allies. These concerns are reinforced by public opinion polls in a number of European countries attesting not only to Gorbachev's personal popularity but to his success in fostering an image of his country as peace-loving.

That issue already is producing political strains within NATO, and the organization also is having to deal with a simmering dispute over the extent to which Europeans should pay for their own defence instead of depending on the presence of 300,000 American troops in Europe.

To the extent that the Soviet Union seeks to exploit these divisions, those in the U.S. who are sceptical of Soviet intentions will be reinforced in their thinking and moves to build on the recent improvement in Soviet-American relations will encounter greater obstacles.

Ray Moseley

The Chicago Tribune, U.S.A.,

exclusive for New Times

Politics: an art of realizing possibilities

But what if a politician faces a seeming impossibility?

Public opinion polls that have just been carried out reveal the attitude of the Soviet people to the Japanese and vice versa. Seventy-seven per cent of those polled in the Soviet Union spoke of feelings of sympathy for the Japanese and only ten per cent took the opposite view. As for the Japanese, the ratio was the other way round – 25 and 67 per cent. It must, regretfully, be stated that a negative image of the Soviet people prevails in Japan. The reasons for this are on the whole well known: Soviet-Japanese relations are deadlocked. Tokyo demands the return of the so-called "northern territories" (four of the chain of South Kurile islands), while for Moscow these territorial claims are unacceptable. That was the way it was six months ago, a year ago, two years ago, and for many years our dialogue, sometimes barely audible, at other times with voices raised, resembled a rehearsal of one and the same scene: the Japanese insist on their view, we on ours. And neither side budges an inch.

As a result, there is no peace treaty (more than four decades after the end of World War Two!), no normal trade and economic relations, none of the mutual rapprochement typical of relations between states in the second half of the eighties. And most important of all, not even a hint that there exists a formula for a settlement – even in the most general form, without any details, but acceptable to both countries.

The Moscow correspondent of the Hokkaido Shimbun Kenryo Yamaya came to our office with a query: is it true that Soviet diplomats and scholars studying Japan had found alternative solutions and were testing them out, intending to propose some sort of a compromise? We at the office knew nothing of any alternative proposals, possibly because there are none, but also possibly because such matters are not discussed openly in the press. The only thing that is discussed is the possibility of journalists and scholars expressing their views and offering advice on matters of current policy.

Diplomats, naturally, have the right to expect that their work should get confidential treatment. But this is a special case. It looks as if the diplomats themselves can't make any headway. Although three decades have passed since the restoration of diplomatic relations, they have been unable to work out a formula for a settlement and have made little progress. That is not meant as a reproach, but as a spur to action. All the available intellectual forces should be drawn into the search, and the results of their labour should not take the form of confidential reports to the powers that be, but the form of a free discussion. Such a discussion would also help shape public opinion.

The Japanese are in a stronger position: they can always put on the negotiating table the results of a poll showing that a certain percentage of the population favours the transfer of the "northern territories" to Japan. In other words, Japanese diplomats have the advantage of always being able to refer to the wishes of the people. Soviet diplomats can of course do the same, but without any figures to back up their statements, since no public polls asking people to state their views on the impasse in Soviet-Japanese relations have ever been held. And what would the poller hear if the history of the Japanese territorial demands is known only to readers of specialized literature? Even our magazine has never described the background to the problem, although it has considered doing so several times. We have confined ourselves to the well-known phrase about "unfounded territorial claims." But they are unfounded for us, not for the Japanese, who have it dinned into their ears, day in day out, that "national sovereignty over primordial Japanese lands" must be restored and they therefore see the situation in a different light. Without well-reasoned public support for the policy with regard to Japan, the diplomats will make no headway.

A visit to Tokyo by the Soviet Foreign Minister is planned for the end of the year. Presumably both ministries concerned are preparing a tentative agenda of the meeting. To help them, we asked a number of experts on bilateral relations for their views.

In Tokyo, when our correspondent Vladimir Ovsyannikov approached Professor ***Haruki Wada*** *of Tokyo University, he was told:*

"For a long time no kind of diplomacy other than purely formal existed between our two countries. Each side clung to its own position, proclaimed it, but showed no desire to come to any kind of agreement and resolve the problem through negotiation.

"Now, it seems to me, Moscow has recognized the existence of a controversial issue in Soviet-Japanese relations. If a problem exists, there is no sense in pretending there is none. That is the new thinking in action.

"In my opinion, the northern territories in Tokyo's policy are not an aim, but a propaganda weapon. It is essential that a search for a new formula should be begun by the Japanese side. To this end a discussion should be held in Japan. So far there is no such readiness from the Japanese side, on the part of our government. But the very fact that this is being discussed signifies a change in the whole atmosphere. It seems to me that both countries bear responsibility for the deadlock in Soviet-Japanese relations. Consequently, a solution should be sought along lines of mutual concessions. But we cannot forget the results of the war. And Japan should show greater restraint and readiness to make greater concessions."

Professor ***Tsunzaki Sato*** *of Nihon Daigaku University suggests that we consider another aspect:*

"It is both natural and necessary that the Soviet Union should join the Asian-Pacific economic system, as this would allow your country to intensify the development of its Far Eastern regions. But the present state of Japanese-Soviet relations stands in the way. Without a full settlement of relations with Japan,

the Soviet Union will not be able to acquire an 'entrance ticket' to participation in the regional cooperation in which our country plays the leading role. And bilateral economic cooperation is virtually impossible without a political settlement. Such are the realities. I realize that Moscow will not hand over the four islands to Japan. So that means that some kind of compromise should be sought, one that would suit public opinion in both Japan and the Soviet Union."

And what do political scientists in Moscow think?

Professor ***Dmitry Petrov,*** *Doctor of History, and a leading expert on Soviet-Japanese relations, had this to say:*

"Relations between the U.S.S.R. and Japan, which largely determine the overall climate in the region, are, in both their level and their scale, far behind Soviet relations with the leading West European countries. The public in the U.S.S.R. and Japan realize that such a situation is anything but normal, and as the round-table discussion in Moscow showed, want to develop and improve Soviet-Japanese relations and turn them into friendly, good-neighbourly relations.

"Our guests once again raised the so-called 'territorial issue'. Naturally, neither side can reject questions raised by the other side, but we again urged our guests to take into account the political realities that developed after the end of the second world war. Nevertheless we were in agreement that the positions taken by the U.S.S.R. and Japan had come a bit closer; that it was necessary to build relations on a basis of realism and a balance of interests.

"Unfortunately, the situation is anything but favourable not only in the field of political relations, but also in trade and economic exchange. And this is not just because our partners abide by the principle of not separating trade from politics. We ourselves are unable to make the most even of the existing possibilities.

"The volume of trade amounts to a mere 2 per cent of the overall volume of Soviet foreign trade and just over one per cent of Japan's. And in its structure the trade is dominated by non-priority and not very promising branches; scientific and technical ties are minimal, which in this age of rapid technological development is abnormal, to say the least...

"The potential of traditional types of economic ties where in exchange for raw materials and fuel, we obtained equipment for developing these very industries, has been exhausted.

"Looking at the situation realistically, it has to be said that for the next ten years we shall be exporting to Japan mainly raw materials. Incidentally, Soviet deliveries of raw materials to Japan at present meet only about two per cent of that country's needs – five times less than similar American exports to Japan.

"Representatives of Japanese business circles have drawn our attention to the inadequacy of the legal acts regulating the status of joint enterprises, which makes Japanese companies wary about investments in the U.S.S.R. As a result, only five of the 110 joint ventures launched in the Soviet Union are Japanese. The commission that discussed economic cooperation suggested approaching the Soviet government and pointing out the need to improve the legal acts and laws governing the setting up and operation of joint ventures.

"The movement for friendship has produced substantial results – it has promoted better mutual understanding between people and thereby helped to improve relations between the U.S.S.R. and Japan. But in this field perhaps more than in any other our lack of economic culture has been shown up. For instance, take the growing role of tourism as an extremely important channel for getting to know each other better. But what is Intourist doing to promote tourism? The Japanese participants in the meeting pointed out with perplexity that while prices in Soviet hotels have greatly increased, there has been no comparable improvement in the quality of service. They also complained that the plane fare from Tokyo to Paris direct was considerably less than if a passenger stopped over in Moscow for two or three days (and during such a stopover, Japanese tourists could be spending in Moscow the freely-convertible currency we value so much). Instead passengers are simply pushed straight on to Paris... As a result, very few Japanese tourists come to the Soviet Union. That is certainly not a way of winning friends..."



Drawing by Kaja Poder

* * *

These views are sufficiently typical. Even the Japanese most favourably inclined towards the Soviet Union cannot imagine the development of relations without the settlement in one form or another of the "territorial issue"... Correspondingly, such a point of view is unacceptable even to those who have sought all their life to improve ties with Japan. Soviet specialists are hoping to strengthen ties in different spheres and thereby remove the contradictions which seem insurmountable, at least at the present stage.

Everything could remain as it is. But then, as Professor Sato warned, the Soviet economy will have little hope of profitable deals with Japanese firms or of acquiring an "entrance ticket" into the regional club. Diplomats will continue to have unpleasant discussions, while politicians will realize that the chances for regional détente are very slim...

But our Japanese neighbours should also weigh all the pros and cons. Full-scale relations with the Soviet Union would mean for Japan not only a major improvement in the political atmosphere of the region, and a reduction in the level of military confrontation, although that in itself would be very significant for a country that constantly speaks of fears of a "threat from the North." Without improving relations with the Soviet Union, Japan can hardly hope for a significant role in world politics, despite its economic might, and would risk remaining a second-rate power. But the impression is that such an outcome corresponds neither to the ambitions of Tokyo politicians, nor the mood of the people. Japan is counting on the visit of Mikhail Gorbachev. But politics is the art of the possible. There seems to be little sense in either side undertaking on its own to solve this problem. As I see it, Moscow politicians have a more than extensive choice promising success and real progress. Some of our Japanese neighbours are showing that they are now more able and willing to negotiate with Moscow.

But it seems the highest echelons in Moscow have not given up hope. When Mikhail Gorbachev received socialist leader Takako Doi and former Premier Nakasone, he spoke of our desire to normalize bilateral realtions.

I do not know what term is used in such cases by diplomats, but in my opinion it is a clear and unambiguous signal. He who has ears to hear...

Leonid Mlechin

Peace comes to Darjeeling



You won't find Gorkhaland on the map of India. There is no such administrative area in the country, but a few months ago banners lettered with "Welcome to Gorkhaland" were streaming in the gusty wind over the streets of Darjeeling and other cities in the mountainous regions of West Bengal state.

They took those banners away and replaced them by "Come to Gorkhas" signs after an agreement has been reached in Calcutta between the central government and the government of West Bengal on the one hand, and the Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF) leading the nationalist movement of local people of Nepalese descent on the other. Under that agreement the district of Darjeeling with a population of one million and a half was given autonomy.

TTT

The Gorkhas account for the majority of the population of this scenic land at the foot of the Himalayas' second highest peak Kanchenjunga. When British colonialists came here in the 1830s they decided to build a resort here. They brought labour from Nepal. Very soon the British decided to grow tea on the green knolls and mountain slopes of Darjeeling. The seeds came from China. Darjeeling tea is now considered one of the best in the world. Working on tea plantations were Gorkhas, settlers from Nepal. They are outgoing and diligent people and for many years they lived side by side without any problems with other ethnic groups inhabiting the region, the Bengalese among them. There was peace in the region until the Gorkha National Liberation Front arrived on the political scene in the middle of 1980. It is led by Shri Subhash Ghrisingh. The Gorkhas say that the formation of the front was prompted among other things by a statement made in the late 1970s by the then Prime Minister of the country Morarji Desai in which he described the Nepalese residents of India as aliens.

At first Ghrisingh's followers could be counted on the fingers of one hand, but gradually the nationalist movement began to gather momentum. One reason for that was the overall growth of nationalist and secessionist trends in various parts of India. The situation was aggravated by the deportation from the north-eastern states of Assam and Meghalaya of several thousand Nepalese who had no official permission to enter India. It was at that time that posters appeared in the streets of Darjeeling to press home the following message on behalf of the Gorkhas: "We are stateless. We are constitutionally tortured all over India. We want our own administration, return our land from Bengal. Our future is in great danger." The posters called for an armed struggle for the establishment of Gorkhaland.

In the spring of 1986 the Gorkhas began an armed struggle in a "do or die" bid to have their demands met. The local economy was seriously damaged. It is based on three T's, that is tea, tourism, and timber. Widely acclaimed as masters of martial arts the Gorkhas made up the crack units of the Indian army and the armies of some other countries. In their struggle they used their traditional weapons, kukris (the massive curved knives), as well as firearms. Villages were set on fire and blood was shed. According to official figures more than 250 people died in armed clashes between the Gorkha National Liberation Front and the police and activists of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) which heads the Left Front in power in West Bengal.

Strikes organized by the GNLF brought the economy of Darjeeling to a standstill. The tourist industry which earned an annual 230 million rupees was paralyzed. Many tea plantations were abandoned. Lumbering was curtailed and trade declined.

Scene of recent fighting

Weary of unrest

Many problems had to be resolved before the August agreement was signed. The three parties to the talks showed a desire to attain a negotiated settlement of the problem, politi-

Rajiv Gandhi, the Chief Minister of West Bengal Jyoti Basu, State Governor Nurul Hasan, and Subhash Ghrisingh signing the agreement.
Photos from the Illustrated Weekly of India.

cal vision, and a readiness to accept a compromise during the talks disrupted not once, and the agreement was signed. Life in Darjeeling and outlying areas is now returning to normal.

Head of the district magistrate D.P. Patra told me as we strolled in the streets of the city and dusk was beginning to fall that the situation was calmer now. People are tired of unrest and violence and would very much like to return to normal life. "We can now deal with our problems in cooperation with the Left Front of West Bengal and the Gorkha National Liberation Front," he continued. "Under the agreement arms have been surrendered starting from early October and my own view is that the operation has been a success. There are still problems in helping those who fled from the unrest to return. Several thousand people fled and they now must be provided with food and helped to restore their ransacked or burnt down homes. Our budget is not a very generous one..."

We could see for ourselves that problems are many, having visited the community of Puttalong in the Tukvar Valley.

M.D. Ray served in the army for 24 years. A few days ago he returned to his native community. He and his family fled in February. While they were away their home was ransacked, but some of their neighbours had a worse run of luck, their homes were burnt down. But M.D. Ray said they would find the going easier now, his wife got a job picking tea leaves and the family would now have more money to augment his modest pension. Tea plantations surround the village and an old tea factory operating on "orthodox" technology is situated here. According to Gopal Somani, assistant manager of the factory, the tea made here is the best. We were treated to excellent fragrant tea brewed from the factory's product.

A line formed outside the gates of the factory in the meantime. Two women were scooping up rice, dry peas, flour, and salt out of jute sacks and handing them out to the needy. There were grownups and children in the line, all of them suffered in the unrest, and were now given food free. "Peace has come," they told us, "and we are happy that Subhash Ghrisingh brought it."

What the leader is sure of

The first thing we noticed at the GNLF headquarters (I was accompanied there by the Novosty Press Agency correspondent A. Zheleznov) was a New Times calendar pinned to the wall. The leader of the GNLF was meeting Soviet journalists for the first time. Subhash Ghrisingh is amazingly tall for a Gorkha. He served in the amry for 6 years and after that taught in school. He gave teaching up in favour of writing and philosophy. He says that he is more of a philosopher than a politician. His credo is that "politics is simply a child of philosophy and those who have mastered it have a right to guide the people."

We asked him for his comment on the August agreement.

"That is a compromise in the interests of all parties concerned. The Gorkhas did not get a state of their own, but secured the resolution of the citizenship problem. There is an official document now that qualifies all Gorkhas living in India since January 26, 1950 (the date of India's Constitution coming into effect) for Indian citizenship. No one has a right any longer to treat them as aliens and from now on they are citizens of India in their own right.

"In keeping with the agreement elections are to be held in December to the autonomous Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council. We shall disband the GNLF and on its basis form a political party representing Gorkha interests. The party will be taking part in the elections. The council will be running the region and it is facing many pressing problems. Housing and jobs are to be provided for thousands of people, highways restored, and a bus terminal and tourist centre built. We expect the central government and the government of West Bengal to extend assistance to us. The chairman of the council will have the status of state minister."

The leader of the GNLF is sure that there will be no more violent unrest in Darjeeling.

"The Gorkhas are good soldiers, but they are not belligerent. Ninety-nine and a half per cent of the Gorkhas support me and the agreement I have signed. The militants won't be able to check the process started by the August agreement or destabilize the situation in Darjeeling."

The militants still pose a threat, though. They did not accept the agreement and are refusing to sheathe their kukris.

We met with one of their leaders in Kalimpong, the second largest city of Darjeeling district. He agreed to receive us on condition of full anonymity.

"That is not what the Gorkhas have been giving their lives for. That kind of peace is not for us, because the objective of our movement has not been met. We shall not lay down our arms and we shall carry on with our armed struggle for the formation of Gorkhaland..."

Can endless confrontation and violence really benefit the Gorkhas? What we saw in Darjeeling shows that the reverse is true.

The agreement reached with the Gorkhas is an example of a flexible approach to dealing with ethnic and religious conflicts which have been posing a threat to India's unity and integrity.

Sergei Irodov,
our own correspondent

DARJEELING – DELHI

October 6, 1973. On the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, Egyptian troops crossed the Suez Canal, broke through the powerful Bar-Lev defence line and established a bridgehead on the East bank. Early on the morning of October 7, Egyptian tanks approached the Mitla Pass, and the following day the Egyptians liberated Eastern Kantara, the second biggest city on the Sinai Peninsula. In mid-October Israel seized the initiative. On October 16 Israeli tank units crossed the canal and broke through between two Egyptian armies. On the night of October 22 Israeli troops surrounded the Third Egyptian Army and advanced as far as the 101st kilometre of the Cairo-Suez Highway.

These are some of the highlights of the fourth Arab-Israeli War which was fiercely fought and involved great loss of life on both sides. Further expansion of the armed conflict was prevented by the joint diplomatic efforts of the Soviet and U.S. governments.

The Yom Kippur War brought about a dramatic change in the face of the Middle East crisis. The events of 15 years ago throw sidelights on the vicissitudes of Soviet-Egyptian relations under Presidents Nasser and Sadat.

War on the day of atonement

15 years on: facts, opinions, lessons

Journalist **Igor TIMOFEYEV** describes how the Egyptians launched their offensive operation code-named Badr.

The road to the October War of 1973, which shattered the myth of the Israeli army's invincibility, began in June 1967. At that time people in the Arab countries were still reeling from the psychological shock of the sudden military débâcle. But Egypt's political leadership, headed by President Nasser, was already weighing up the situation and trying to assess it. The depressing picture of the June tragedy was brought home to Nasser gradually. To some extent he was helped towards an objective view of the situation by Marshal Zakharov, the then Chief of Staff of the Soviet armed forces, who arrived in Egypt a fortnight after the end of the 1967 war. What he saw on arrival left little room for illusions. Of the 1,364 tanks and self-propelled guns the Egyptian army had had on the morning of June 5, 700 had been lost in Sinai. More than a hundred of them were undamaged and another 200 had suffered insignificant damage. Of the 280 combat planes, only 50 had survived. Anti-aircraft forces had also suffered heavy losses. Considering that the radar detection and warning system had been virtually knocked out, the country was in effect defenceless against an Israeli air raid.

During his June 1967 visit to Cairo, President Podgorny of the U.S.S.R. was handed a long list of items of military hardware, which, in the opinion of the Egyptian command, were urgently needed to restore the combat capability of the armed forces. The Soviet side readily responded to the request to make good the losses in weapons and equipment.

Rising from the ashes

To forestall possible Israeli attempts to cross the Suez Canal and strike at Egypt, Marshal Zakharov suggested that the Egyptian command urgently set up a forward line of defence on the west bank of

October 6, 1973. Egyptian troops have forced the Suez Canal
Photo courtesy A.R.E. Embassy in Moscow

the Suez Canal. As a long-term goal, he set the task of building a modern army in Egypt. During the discussion of these issues – President Nasser insisted on discussing not only the general objectives, but all the particulars – the idea arose of asking Soviet military advisers to help the Egyptian army.

In the autumn of 1967 there was unusual activity in the corridors of the General Staff in Moscow. Officers, urgently recalled from their service in Soviet army units were arriving in the capital daily. After being briefed and issued with foreign passports containing Egyptian visas, they flew to Cairo. The situation was made still more unusual by the fact that they were all wearing civilian clothes, and one could only guess at their military rank from their age and behavior.

Upon their arrival, the Soviet advisers were temporarily lodged right in the centre of the city in the bustling, noisy Republic Street, at the Victoria Hotel which had seen better days. Later they moved into apartment blocks in the former Olympic Village. Most of the time, however, only their families lived there, as the advisers themselves were assigned to army units immediately on their arrival.

Dressed in Egyptian uniforms, but with no insignias, the advisers shared the hardships of military service with their charges. They were billeted with their units, usually in dugouts, issued the same food rations as the Egyptian officers, drank the same tepid, cloudy water, which was delivered daily in tanks, and they were exposed to the same dangers when Israeli planes swooped down over the desert, out of the dazzling blue sky.

Working under daily artillery shelling and frequent air raids, which Israel resumed from early July 1967, Egyptian engineers and technicians, aided by Soviet experts, quickly repaired the radar detection and warning system and the military airfields. The training of pilots resumed at the Egyptian Air Force centres.

By November 1967 a reliable defence line had been built in the Suez Canal zone. The Egyptian army was growing stronger every day, and gaining confidence as the constant artillery exchanges were becoming increasingly fierce in the course of the so-called "war of attrition."

"The war of attrition" took a heavy toll of both sides. From July 1967 to August 1970 Israeli casualties amounted to 700 dead and 2,700 wounded, far more than its total losses in the June 1967 war. Egypt sustained much heavier losses. In 1969 alone, at least 4,000 civilian workers died in air raids on the missile sites that were under construction. Losses were considerable in the troops, especially in the forward units, where not only Egyptian officers and men, but Soviet advisers were killed.

The situation was growing increasingly tense, but the Israelis were frustrated in their hope that Nasser would give in and call off "the war of attrition." In March 1969 the Egyptian army dramatically increased the scale of its activities in the Suez Canal zone. While in 1968 artillery engagements had taken place several

times a week, they now occurred several times a day. In late 1969 the Israelis concentrated their efforts on delivering air strikes on civilian targets outside Cairo. Simultaneously they staged daily air raids on the anti-aircraft missile sites being built in the Canal zone. "Air reprisals" reached their peak in early 1970, when Israeli planes bombed a plant in Abu Zabal and a secondary school in Bahr-el-Bakr. The number of civilian victims, including children, soared.

It was against this background that Nasser made an urgent visit to Moscow in January 1970.

Supremacy in the air begins on the ground

The President left Cairo on board an air force plane at dawn on January 22, 1970, and landed in Moscow at 10 a.m. At the very first meeting with the Soviet leaders, held the same day, Nasser asked for missiles capable of hitting low-flying targets. He was very candid in describing the crisis situation in Egypt, which threatened to undermine his authority in the eyes of the people unless he found a way of protecting civilians against Israeli air raids.

In agreeing to meet Nasser's request, the Soviet leadership was aware that it was making a serious political move which could have grave inernational consequences. Colonel General Katyshkin (Ret.), then chief Soviet adviser in Egypt who was present at the talks, recalls the following conversation.

"Can you guarantee that these missiles will provide 100 per cent cover for Cairo?" Prime Minister Kosygin asked Defence Minister Marshal Grechko.

"No," replied Grechko. "You can never be a hundred per cent certain in a wartime situation."

The sharp exchange between Kosygin and Grechko was interrupted by the General Secretary of the CC CPSU, Leonid Brezhnev.

"Stop arguing," he said. "Obviously we must adopt a constructive decision."

The decision was taken at a Political Bureau meeting on Sunday, January 25. That same day, Brezhnev told Nasser that the Soviet Union would shortly send anti-aircraft missiles to Egypt to provide air protection for the interior of the country.

Time was pressing, and the Soviet side got down to business without delay. To increase the combat ability of the missile force, it was decided to reinforce the air defences with fighter planes.

On a frosty night in January 1970, the first trainload of technology and personnel set out on its way. The southern sea port where the troops were to board the ships for Egypt was like a war camp. For the sake of secrecy, military hardware was loaded at night. The bulk carrier Rosa Luxemburg put to sea before dawn and arrived in the port of Alexandria several days later.

Throughout March 1970 there was an uninterrupted flow of military hardware. The anti-aircraft missile complexes and MiG-21 fighter planes were put on combat duty at dawn on April 15. On the first day two wings were alerted, but the Israeli planes that had invaded Egyptian air space avoided an engagement and swung back towards Sinai. On April 18 the Israelis curtailed their raids on inland areas of Egypt.

The struggle for supremacy in the air, which began on April 15, had reached its peak by mid-summer. In July and early August the Israelis lost 13 combat planes. This had a sobering effect on the hotheads in Tel Aviv, who decided that there was no point in prosecuting the air war in the Canal Zone.

The cease-fire agreement that came into force on August 8, 1970 put an end to the "war of attrition." The Yom Kippur War was still three years off.

General Staff prepares for war

The Egyptians drew lessons from the Sinai tragedy. It was obvious after June 1967 that one of their main tasks was to streamline all levels of the Egyptian General Staff to turn it into the brain centre of the armed forces. As a result of personnel shake-ups in 1967-69, many competent and talented officers with practical experience in the field joined the Egyptian General Staff.

Work on the plan for the offensive operation code-named Granite started to go full stride in 1971, which President Sadat proclaimed to be "the year of the final solution." Operation Granite was planned in total secrecy by a narrow circle of people, including Egyptian staff officers and their advisers.

The first signs of a rift between the Egyptian and Soviet sides emerged during the discussion of different scenarios for Operation Granite. Reporting on the state and morale of the troops, some Egyptian generals were increasingly doubtful as to the success of an offensive operation, arguing that the troops lacked this or that kind of military hardware. On the other hand, complaints about the quality



Bursting through the Bar-Lev defence line on the east bank of the Canal.

of Soviet armaments became more frequent. These complaints, openly encouraged by Defence Minister M. Sadek, sapped the morale of many commanders, who were now able to put the blame for shortcomings in the training of personnel on the "poor quality" of the fighting equipment supplied by the Soviet Union.

Subsequent developments showed that these sentiments in the army were deliberately fomented by those who wanted to see Soviet-Egyptian relations curtailed and were pushing President Sadat towards a decision to discontinue the Soviet military advisers' mission in Egypt.

The Soviet military advisers left Egypt in July 1972. By that time the Egyptian army, risen from the ashes, was ready for the operation to liberate Sinai. The plan of the offensive, codenamed Badr, developed under General Shedhli in 1973, reflected the complex evolutionary process the General Staff and the whole of the Egyptian army had undergone in the five years of Soviet-Egyptian military cooperation.

The Badr plan was set in motion 15 years ago, on October 6, 1973.

Marshal Zakharov and Egyptian Defence Minister Fawzi (far right) watch an Egyptian Air Force exercise.

Vladimir VINOGRADOV, former U.S.S.R. Ambassador to Egypt (1970-74), now Foreign Affairs Minister of the R.S.F.S.R., Colonel General Mahmut GAREYEV, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces and Air Force Colonel General Grigory DOLNIKOV remember:

Vladimir Vinogradov. At 2 p.m. on October 6, 1973, President Sadat rang me up using the city telephone and not as usual the special line. He said the Egyptian troops had crossed the Suez Canal. I heartily wished him every success.

Mahmut Gareyev. The hostilities lasted 18 days, from October 6 to 24. In military terms, the Yom Kippur War was a major operation, involving as it did 1.5 million troops, 6,300 tanks, 13,200 guns and mortars, and 1,500 combat planes. By way of comparison, 6,300 tanks were involved on the Soviet side in the Berlin operation during the second world war.

While in the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, the Arab troops were passive, in 1973 the Egyptian and Syrian troops were more resolute and active. Take, for instance, the massive operation to cross the Suez Canal, in the course of which the Egyptian troops breached a powerful Israeli military defence line. This was a veritable feat which testified to the high morale of the Egyptian officers and men.

As a rule, the level of military skills and fighting prowess can be judged by the losses of both sides in the course of hostilities. While in the 1967 War, the ratio was 1:10 – 1:20 against the Arabs, it was dramatically different in the Yom Kippur War. The Egyptian and Israeli armies each lost about 3,000 men; the Egyptian side lost 890 tanks and the Israeli about 700 tanks. Each side lost about 500-600 pieces of ordnance.

All this needs to be stressed as there is still a widely held view in the West that the Arabs are no match for the Israelis as fighters. The Yom Kippur War gives the lie to this idea. One must give their due to the Soviet military advisers, who had managed to boost the combat ability of the Egyptian and Syrian forces in a short time from 1967. I have pleasant memories of my work with the General Staff of the Egyptian Army, Air Force Commander General Baghdadi, and Air Force Chief of Staff General Mubarak, who proved to be a talented commander.

Grigory Dolnikov. ...In 1967, the Egyptian Air Force and Air Defences were practically wiped out. Israeli planes bombed the suburbs of Cairo with impunity.

We arrived in Egypt in March 1970. At that time, the Soviet military advisers and Egyptian generals and officers had no secrets from each other. We were working for a common cause.

Initially, while the Egyptian pilots were being trained, Soviet fighter planes took part in the defence of Egypt. We lost several of our men.

Dispute over arms

Mahmut Gareyev. We provided Egypt – on easy terms – with anti-aircraft missiles, 2,500 tanks and 1,200 combat aircraft. This was the most advanced weaponry for its time: T-62 tanks, MiG-21 and MiG-23 planes and the Kvadrat (Square) anti-aircraft-missile complex. The Soviet Union trained more a than 8,000 military experts for the Egyptian armed forces.

It is generally acknowledged that the Soviet military hardware acquitted itself well during the October 1973 warfare. From my own experience of work in Egypt, I can say with confidence that complaints about the quality of Soviet military hardware came from those who did not want to or were afraid to fight.

Vladimir Vinogradov. First-class military hardware and the presence of Soviet military advisers in Egypt not only strengthened the country's defence capability, but served as a deterrent to the Israelis.

All the more of a surprise was President Sadat's decision to send the Soviet military advisers home. It was an unpleasant piece of news. This was how it happened. I was briefing Sadat on the results of U.S. President Nixon's visit to Moscow. Incidentally, during the visit the Soviet Union was upholding the interests of the Arab states, including Egypt. Then all of a sudden President Sadat declared: "Please tell Moscow that Egypt has no more need for the services of the Soviet military personnel." Well, to make such a decision was Egypt's sovereign right, although it would not be out of place ot recall that the Soviet military advisers had come to Egypt not of their own accord, but in response to prolonged and persistent requests from President Nasser.

Politically, Sadat's decision was a gesture designed to please the Americans, signifying that the Egyptian leadership was ready to cooperate with the U.S.

Mahmut Gareyev. In those difficult days, the Soviet Union, as always, came to Egypt's aid. With fighting sill in progress, the Soviet Union, in reply to Egypt's request, airlifted military technology, spare parts and ammunition to Egypt. The operation involved 4,000 military transport planes, carrying large amounts of military hardware and ammunition. An additional 1,500 tanks and 109 planes were delivered.

Vladimir Vinogradov. When the Israeli tanks came to within 100 kilometres of Cairo, Sadat at first said I shouldn't pay any attention to this. But as early as October 21 he approached the Soviet leadership asking it to get the Israelis stop their offensive. Using every diplomatic lever available, the Soviet leadership, despite U.S. opposition, forced through the adoption of the U.N. Security Council's cease-fire Resolution 338 of October 22, followed shortly afterwards by Resolution 339. Ignoring the U.N. resolutions, the Israelis continued to advance, closing in on the 3rd Army near Suez.

In this critical situation, Sadat appealed to the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. to send their troops to Egypt (jointly or separately) to prevent the decimation of the 3rd Army. On October 26, the Soviet Union approached the U.S. with the suggestion that Egypt's request be met. The Soviet leadership warned that if the United States refused, the U.S.S.R. would go it alone. The Soviet move proved effective. The Israeli troops stopped their offensive that same day.

Ambassador Vladimir VINOGRADOV: *Soviet military experts had come to Egypt not of their own accord, but in response to prolonged and persistent requests from President Nasser.*

General Mahmut GAREYEV: *Complaints about the quality of Soviet arms usually came from those who did not want to or were afraid to fight.*



General Grigory DOLNIKOV: *We lost several of our men.*

Ten centimetres East of Suez

Mahmut Gareyev. On the whole, we consider the Yom Kippur War to have been a great achievement for the Arabs. Unfortunately, the Egyptian and Syrian troops failed to consolidate and exploit their initial success. We believe the main reason for this to have been poor coordination between the two Arab states. President Sadat had failed to inform the Syrian side that Operation Badr was planned to a small depth. The October war highlighted the grievous consequences of lack of unity and coordination in the Arab ranks.

In terms of military strategy, the Egyptian President's mistake was that he did not want to pursue hostilities to a greater depth. In his talks with the Soviet advisers, he repeatedly said that all he needed was to gain "ten centimetres of land East of Suez," in order to draw the attention of the world public to the Middle East problem; whereupon, he said, I will seek to end the war on terms acceptable to Egypt.

Under any circumstances it was his duty to inform the Syrians of his plans. As it turned out, while calling the Syrians to act to great depth, Sadat was planning his own actions in a very different way.

Vladimir Vinogradov. Even so, the Egyptian army showed that it was well trained, and that Arab troops were armed with weapons of high quality, even better than those used by the enemy. President Sadat told me so on many occasions, and asked me to convey his gratitude to the Soviet leadership. In return, I asked him to say this to the Egyptian people and soldiers. But he never did so.

In mid-October there was a strange pause in the hostilities. The Israeli troops used it to deal with Syria. Syria could not withstand the onslaught alone. The Israeli army then turned southwards, where the Egyptian troops were totally inactive. I asked Sadat why he was allowing Syria to be bled white. He replied: "Let it go on the defensive and wage guerrilla warfare. Our main goal is to knock out as many enemy forces as possible. A strange tactic, to say the least. King Hussein of Jordan later told me that he had repeatedly made Sadat offers to enter into the war. President Assad of Syria agreed, but President Sadat of Egypt refused.

Be that as it may, the Yom Kippur War created a very favourable situation for a political settlement in the Middle East. First, the Arab states had proved that they could score a military victory over Israel. Second, the Israeli leadership was aware that its troops could be defeated, if not now then later, considering the vast military-political and economic potential of the Arab countries. Third, world public opinion swung in favour of the Arabs.

I recently visited Cairo, where I met President Mubarak. We had a friendly and useful talk. Much has changed in Egypt. Political dialogue is getting under way and trade, economic and cultural cooperation is developing.

Yakov Borovoi,
Ivan Menshikov

An unprejudiced view

Our neighbour: first-hand impressions plus some statistics

I would say one never gives as much thought to one's own country as when travelling abroad. My recent visit to Finland convinced me of that once again.

While in Helsinki, I lodged on the outskirts, if not in suburbia, as the Pasila neighbourhood is more often than not absent from the map of the city. Still, there is a silver lining, as one sees a lot while travelling to one's destination. Then, in the breaks between work one tries to catch sight of what one might term the realities.

The comparisons are in the main disturbing. One can't help seeing that there is a lot to learn. After all, for so long we saw ourselves as the teachers and others as pupils, if not dropouts from the school of progressive social experience. Now we are taking sober stock of the situation around us realizing that two things are needed for the most wonderful and audacious of ideas. First, they have to be implemented and, secondly, they have to be creatively expanded on. Our performance was bad on both counts, if any at all.

We started out afresh some three and a half years ago, when we stepped down from the rostrum and, rolling up our sleeves, set about bringing the gap between words and actions. As regards words, things seem pretty good. But actions are another matter. However, we are on the lookout and welcome every fresh idea, even though it may have been suggested long ago but fell on deaf ears. We are also making use of every ounce of progressive experience, whether our own or that of others. To which end we must be courageous as for a long period of our history the experience of others has been alien. It was not simply unpatriotic, but extremely dangerous to be complimentary about what one saw across the border. We have trained whole generations of writers on international affairs to be extremely adept at exposing the ulcers of capitalist society. Neither will I deny my modest contribution to that effort. As for our own country, we displayed skill in demonstrating chiefly our achievements, which the occasional defects or "outstanding issues" presumably could not obscure. We were intoxicated by the amount of iron and cement produced per capita, completely oblivious of the "capita" as such, inasmuch as we maintained a priori that the "capita" in our case were much richer and purer than the "capita" over there. If only that had been the case!

Today, though, the situation is such that we no longer fear charges of "blunted class vigilance," "political myopia," "adulation" and similar mortal sins. The experience of others must be studied and analyzed; rejecting out of hand everything that has given a good account of itself outside our own territory will lead to the repetition of old mistakes.

The above discourse is only an introduction to some observations as regards the social sphere in our next-door Western capitalist neighbour, Finland.

When trifles are not trifles

This October in Helsinki had sunny days galore. Only fallen leaves crunched underfoot, the only "garbage" one comes across here. "Still, it was cleaner before," my new acquaintance, Erkki Peltonen, managing director of the firm SN Kirjatoy, grumbles. "Before we had janitors, but now we have centralized street sweeping." Let me note that where I live in Moscow, though we also have "centralized street cleaning," but one still sees a lot on the asphalt apart from desiccated autumn leaves. Incidentally, a few words about the asphalt, which in Helsinki is being ousted everywhere by flagstones. Now, how-

A fish market scene in Helsinki

ever, the initial cost may be more than asphalt, yet when one recalls how often the asphalt is opened up for repair and the laying of various pipes and cables, one realizes that it would be far cheaper neatly to remove the flagstones and then put them back and fill up the gaps with sand. Last summer I saw that being done in Jurmala on the Latvian littoral.

And speaking of pavements, one might add that in Helsinki a cyclist often speeds past a pedestrian. Many pavements have a white line down the middle, with the silhouettes of grown-up and child on one side to indicate the pedestrian walkway and the silhouette of a cyclist on the other. In some places there are special cycling tracks. Could this be one reason why the air in Helsinki is so much cleaner than in Moscow and elsewhere in this country?

There are traffic lights at every crossing, even where there is not much in the way of traffic. Even when not a single car is in sight, all pedestrians patiently wait for the green light to go on. Often red is accompanied by an unobtrusive intermittent buzz and green by an unintermittent buzz, no doubt to take care of the absent-minded, the colour-blind, or the blind proper. A trifle, one might think? But isn't daily living made up of trifles?

Suppose one has to take a tram. There is a time-table at every stop. At worst the tram will be a minute or two late. I travelled by tram at all hours, but never found myself in a packed car. Besides trams there are buses, an underground railway and electric trains running from the northern outskirts to the centre of Helsinki. No matter what means of transport one takes, the ticket costs six marks – with seven marks to the ruble and four and a half to the dollar, according to the official rate of exchange. That is not cheap. However, when one buys a sheaf of ten tickets, it costs only 49, not 60 marks, and then, after one's ticket has been punched on an electric train, for instance, one is free to use any means of municipal transport for the duration of a whole hour afterwards.

Or take such a trifle as the concern shown in every shop, with "thank you, sir" for any, even the cheapest, purchase. As for queues, all I can remember are the two people in front of me at check-outs in a self-service bookshop. I had to wait no more than a couple of minutes, even though one of the two customers in front paid cash while the other used his credit card, which the check-out cashier inserted into the slot of the computer linked up with the bank that had issued the card. That done, the check-out girl smiled as she packed the books and sealed the package with scotch tape.

Note that every single garbage bin in hotel room, garden, or on the street has a black plastic bag inside, which is removed and replaced by another one. In courtyards one sees bins for bottle returns that always gleam in the sunshine. Building workers are also extremely neat. They take up no more than a yard or so of the street, while the buildings they erect or repair are clad in green plastic material so as not to offend pedestrians.

Many in the Soviet Union know how Finnish workers operate. Opposite instances are afforded by newly built or excellently repaired houses in Moscow or Tallinn, ships, the celebrated Finnish paper and the clothes that can sometimes be seen in our shops. But how do they really live? What do they earn and what do they spend? When can they rely on the state? And when do they have to rely exclusively on their own money?

The family balance sheet

Matti Toiviainen and Timo Karjalainen, two young staff members of the Ministry of Health and Social Security, are both specialists in family budgeting. They rolled off many statistics at the drop of a hat, occasionally thumbing through the many pamphlets and reference booklets published by their Ministry.

According to the Central Statistical Office, in 1985 Finland had a total population of 4,910,664. This number is expected to increase to 5,006,042 by 1990 and to 5,073,288 by the year 2000. Age groups break down as follows (see Table below).

The trend towards an increase in the proportion of the elderly is obvious.

Toiviainen told me that the average family has 1.7 children, that 15 per cent were single-parent families, and that both parents in 70 per cent of families were wage earners. The average family with two wage earners drew monthly respectively 7,500 marks for the husband and 5,025 marks for the wife. If childless, they are taxed 3,930 marks. However, with a child of up to two, they pay tax of 3,559 marks, with two children, one under two and the other under four, tax is 3,418 marks, while with three children, with one under two, the second under four, and the next under six, tax is 3,255 marks.

With one child under eight the tax is 3,655 marks, but for the average family with four children, with one under two, one under four, one under eight and one under 13, tax is 3,050 marks, while with five children the average family pays 2,800 marks in tax. Taxation is strictly differentiated, with all families broken down into seven categories, depending on income. The lowest category includes families with two wage earners drawing 5,010 marks a month, or

	1985	1990	2000
up to the age of 6	452,044(9.2%)	445,265(8.9%)	391,125(7.7%)
7-14	499,488(10.2%)	524,509(10.5%)	497,403(9.8%)
15-64	3,341,398(68%)	3,361,129(67.1%)	3,424,404(67.5%)
65-74	369,192(7.5%)	390,792(7.8%)	429,678(8.5%)
over 75	248,542 (5.1%)	284,347(5.7%)	330,678(6.5%)

A new housing development

one wage earner drawing 3,000 marks a month. The top category includes families with montly incomes of over 20,000 and 12,000 marks respectively.

The average tax on all families is about 31 per cent. Famlies in the lowest bracket with two wage earners, get a monthly subsidy of 640 marks if they have one child and as much as 1,406 marks if they have five children. In the case of monthly incomes of 7,500 marks, which fall into the second lowest category, the monthly benefit paid out in the case of two and more children ranges from 304 to 991 marks. Should there be only one wage earner, the benefit is increased to cover five of the seven categories mentioned. The ceiling is 1,385 marks in the case of the lowest-category family with five children. In the case of a fifth-category family with three children with a monthly income of 9,000 marks the grant is 130 marks.

I suppose your head is reeling from the above figures. But they are necessary to understand why the most expensive meat costing 80 marks and more per kilo (the best cuts, as other cuts go at half if not a quarter of that price) are bought up at supermarkets. Incidentally, food accounts for about a quarter of a family budget, i.e., the disposable income of the average two-parent family after taxation, and after grants and benefits, if they are entitled to them. Rent, fares and clothing account for 20, 16, and 7 per cent respectively. In the case of an average family, with a net monthly income of 8,000 marks, about a third is left. However, part may go on medical treatment if needed. I am not going to dwell on the subject in this article.

However, allow me to concentrate on what is perhaps for us here in the Soviet Union still a very acute issue, and nor is it an easy matter in Finland, as Matti and Timo told me. In Helsinki, the renting of a flat is not the general rule. Flats are usually bought, with most would-be flat owners shouldering a heavy mortgage; no wonder, as one square metre of housing in a block of flats may cost anywhere from 3,000 to 5,000 marks. It is still more expensive to buy a cottage, where the cost per square metre ranges from 4,000 to 8,000 marks. Since the average family of three occupies 64 square metres of floor space, I leave it to you to work out the total.

Taking it easy

Newlyweds prefer to break away from their parents. When I asked whether they could rely on their parents for money, I was told that as a rule this was not the case. So what do they do? First they must save from 10 to 20 per cent of the sum needed to purchase a flat or cottage. Then they can apply to a bank for a mortgage, which is granted over a 10- to 15-year term at a certain interest. They can of course apply for state assistance, as in that case the rate of interest will be less and the term of the loan will be as long as 20 years. On the other hand, this amount will only account for part of the sum required. Could this be why newlyweds are in no hurry to have children? On average, the first child is born when the woman is 26 years old.

It stands to reason that all these people, who have mortgaged themselves to the hilt, cling to their jobs and go all out for promotion. On the other hand, the housing is excellent. In Pasila, where I lodged, the newly built blocks of flats are extremely neat, while the spacious courtyards have well equipped playgrounds and plenty of well-tended greenery. Ground floors house banks, dry-cleaning establishments and supermarkets vending food not only for people, but also for household pets, detergents, things for the home, books, video cassettes and much more. Queues are unheard of. Examining these blocks of flats and reflecting on the cost, I recollected that I myself had had to cope with a similar problem only some ten years or so ago. My cooperative apartment of 58.6 square metres consisting of two rooms plus kitchen, hallway, bathroom and WC, cost me 13,500 rubles, or 94,500 marks. Considering the difference in average incomes there and here, I would say my flat was even more expensive. And, incidentally, I am not mentioning the standard of construction.

Vladimir Zhitomirsky,

our special correspondent

HELSINKI-MOSCOW

Photos by the author, TASS and from album "Helsinki" (Finland)

Ideals and interests

Can national security be equated with state security? What is the relationship between them?

Do we have national interests? The answer to that question would seem so obvious that the question itself is absurd, but let us nonetheless examine it.

Our revolution was perceived by the people who made it as part of a world revolution, and the founding of the Soviet state as a prelude to a world Soviet Republic. At that time therefore "the Soviet national interest" would have appeared to be a contradiction in terms.

The term "national" is understood in this context as embracing the needs and wishes of the entire nation, rather than something that has to do with the nationalities question. We encountered considerable problems in arriving at an appropriate concept. We acknowledged the existence of the interests of the state which, however, was destined to wither away in the long term, but we perceived talk of "the national interest" in the West as no more than a cunning ruse by the ruling elite or the bourgeoisie which claimed its own interests to be those of all of society. That is also true, but any society claiming to be normal must have common interests, or it will be broken up by centrifugal forces.

Perestroika and security

It all proved to be far more complicated in real life. Expectations of world revolution gave way to plans to build socialism in one country, and the prospect for the withering away of the state, to its disproportionate growth under Stalin's dictatorial rule. As a result, the state, and the bureaucracy acting on its behalf, came to dominate society, very often acting contrary to its interests. We hear of state security all the time, but few ever wonder what its relationship is with national security, if the latter is taken to mean the security of the whole of society.

The two notions are very different, however. From the point of view of the whole of society, assuring the interests of the state, that is its sovereignty and territorial integrity, is a paramount national interest. We have never neglected the security of our state, and in the 1970s and 1980s, for instance, our capability to repel an outside threat increased unprecedentedly. At the same time, however, economic, social and political problems kept on accumulating in society. That is the reason why our national security failed to grow in the "pre-perestroika" period. Only a sound, dynamic and self-confident society is capable of assuring its own security and the security of the state. That is why perestroika is a crucial factor in strengthening our security.

The vital interest of our society and its principal national interest is to be able to improve the socialist system unimpeded. If society has every possibility of realizing that interest and living in conditions of lasting peace and freedom, it is secure. Our society had to defend its interests in the battle against the nazis, and there have been periods in our history when the chief threat to our security was an external military threat. Can we consider our national interests to have been reliably protected under Stalin, when monstrous aberrations distorted socialism?

The violence committed by the Stalinist state machine against society amounted not only to denying society freedom. The other aspect of the mass repressions and lawlessness was the weakening of the country's defences, which manifested itself tragically in the early period of the war. Nazi analysts and strategists believed that this country, bled white by the loss of millions of lives in the 1930s, would not be able to resist the onslaught of their war machine. They failed, however, to take into account the fact that they would have to reckon not only with Stalin's regime, but also with the entire Soviet people, which defended its right to exist and its fundamental values.

The tragic experience of the second world war and the deeply ingrained memories of an endless succession of wars and onslaughts that our history has seen at times eclipsed everything but the goal of national survival. Fear of the external threat was largely accounted for by the fear of the capitalist encirclement that checked world revolution and turned the Soviet Republic into a besieged outpost. The siege mentality remained with us at times of crisis as well as in times of peace. It was independent of political circumstances and was of an ideological character stemming from an ideologized approach to the outside world.

Parameters of parity

For a long time we did not distinguish between our ideals and those of world revolution, thereby linking our security with the victory of socialism on an international scale. The more countries that embarked on a socialist course of development, the more secure we should have felt, but in reality that "idealist" approach was combined with a Stalinist foreign policy which was increasingly becoming a great power policy.

To a certain extent, this amounted to a return to the traditional geopolitical frame of reference that determined the policy of prerevolutionary Russia, whereby the interests of the state were assured by the maximum growth of its might, and particularly its military might. In contemporary societies, however, the logic of geopolitics goes through the test of internal political debates which decide how far this or that country is prepared to go to assure a benevolent environment. While the command-and-administer system ruled in this country, society was unable to discuss and clearly define its own interests and compare them with the actual disposition of forces in the world.

The combination of ideology and geopolitics had bizarre results. Until perestroika got underway, stagnation within the country was combined with heightened activity on the international scene. That activity was largely extensive, and aimed at covering the maximum possible number of regions and establishing "relations of friendship and cooperation" with a growing number of countries. The future of socialism and our security was to a certain extent linked to the fate of regimes which were arbitrarily described as socialist-oriented.

The struggle for spheres of influence was imposed on the Soviet Union contrary to the foreign policy credo of socialism. In this way stagnation within the country was increased, both through the diversion of a considerable propor-

tion of our national resources for these purposes and the generation of illusory foreign policy "achievements," which prevented a realistic assessment of the problems that were accumulating within our society. As crisis trends gathered momentum in Soviet society, this country began to lose its appeal to the developing nations as a model for socio-economic development. Gradually Soviet policy in the developing world came to be seen in the world at large solely in its military aspects.

Events in the developing countries proved a factor in the decline of the policy of détenté in the 1970s. Naturally, Soviet policy in the Third World was merely a pretext for those Western forces opposed to the easing of tensions and an end to the cold war. They would hardly have stood a chance of success had Western public opinion not been convinced that the U.S.S.R. was trying to assure its own security by undermining that of the West and extending its influence to all parts of the globe.

A contest with the United States for spheres of influence cannot be in the best interests of this country. The notion of strategic parity was advanced as the principal means of assuring our security, but was it in our interests to become involved in the wasteful arms race, and copy every move made by the United States? The answer to that is "no."

Since the relegation to the past of the far-fetched slogans of "catching up with and overtaking America," we have for some reason abandoned the idea of attaining parity with the United States with respect to the wide range of indices that characterize the state of the economy and living standards. Why not try and attain parity in the quality of hospital equipment, the number of personal computers or the availability of high-quality household appliances? Regrettably, it would be quite unrealistic to try to do that now, given the real state of our economy today. We must acknowledge once again that the real measure of the guarantees of our national interest is above all the level of socio-economic development, rather than the parameters of military power.

Since the mid 1970s we have lagged behind the United States in our GNP growth rate and more recently, in our productivity growth rate as well. According to the estimates of some of our economists during the period of stagnation, the Soviet Union found itself between 50th and 60th place in the world in terms of living standards, which is of course a glaring discrepancy with our potential. Over the past two decades life expectancy has continued to decline in this country, an unprecedented development in the history of contemporary industrialized societies. The list goes on and on, unfortunately. In other words, our national interests are now confronted with a danger that stems above all from the internal distortions of socialism.

Drawing by Vasily Vereshchenko

Matters of state

One of these distortions to be dealt with as part of perestroika is the penetration of the state into all aspects of life in society, and the substitution of the interests of an entrenched bureaucracy for the interests of society. For decades national interests were to all intents and purposes replaced by departmental interests, whether with respect to the uses of the national water resources or foreign policy ventures. The U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, has had the courage to acknowledge that "the foreign policy service carried out its duties in isolation from the vital interests of the nation." Regrettably, under the rule of the command-and-administer system and lack of openness in society, not a single department managed to avoid committing that sin.

The problem assumed an extra dimension with respect to national security. The natural desire of every department to preserve bureaucratic secrets was complemented here by the traditional classification of any information relating to national security. There can be no doubt that only society itself can determine what is in its national interests and what runs counter to them, how to strike a balance between various departmental interests, and how to assure common interests. It can do that in open discussion,

just as we are discussing the state of and prospects for our economy today. There is no need to divulge military secrets, but this discussion does not require that they be divulged. It would suffice if we knew about ourselves at least a part of that which is known to our "potential adversary." It is wonderful of course that the U.S. Secretary of Defence had the opportunity to climb into the cockpit of a top-secret Soviet bomber during his visit to the Soviet Union. It is a pity, though, that the Soviet public have never seen any of it. One cannot help wondering which are more important, military or departmental secrets?

The point of course is not the lack of relevant information, but the lack of a tradition of open and democratic discussion of what constitutes our own national interest. At the moment we are engrossed in filling in the "blank spots" in our history, as we try to define the complex problems that we have to face and find ways of dealing with them. That is only natural, because the future of socialism depends on what is taking place within our society, and we must identify all of our internal reserves.

Lost credits

We cannot count on outside help here. Contrary to their appeals for the democratization of Soviet society and their past promotion of market relations in the Soviet economy, some members of the ruling U.S. elite are not at all enthusiastic about perestroika in the Soviet Union, perceiving it as possibly strengthening a geopolitical rival. In an open letter to the next president of the United States, Henry Kissinger, a seasoned advocate of geopolitics, warned him of that danger.

Even if a different point of view prevails in the United States and it is acknowledged there that perestroika is bringing about an entirely different society in cooperation with which it will be easier to make progress towards a safer world, even so, no one is going to help us unless we help ourselves. Even if oil prices dramatically increase and we again have a source of hard currency, is there any guarantee that the money will not again be wasted just as billions of petrodollars were wasted in the 1970s? If all trade barriers fell tomorrow, how many competitive goods could we offer? The converse is also true: if our economy is radically restructured to work at full capacity, there will hardly be anyone capable of impeding its growth. The idea, of course, is not to perpetuate the isolation of our economy: we have already paid a heavy price for failure to make our currency convertible and the policy of "non-participation" in many international, economic and financial organizations. It is clear today that reviving the national economy and incorporating it into the system of world economic ties will be difficult, and take a great deal of time and that we must pursue realistic objectives. Bearing in mind the strategic goal of closing the growing gap between our economy and the economies of the leading industrialized nations, we must not forget about the need for closer integration of the member-countries of the CMEA. Strange as it may seem, there is still no real conversion of the currencies of the socialist countries. Putting that cooperation on a qualitatively new level is in the national interests of all parties concerned. Both national and international security stand to gain from it.

Code of conduct

In order to create conditions more conducive to our internal development, we must above all cast off at least part of the foreign policy burden that we have ourselves assumed. True, this country is a giant continental power and cannot be indifferent to what is going on in the vicinity of its borders. We would be ill-advised, however, to succumb to the temptation to interpret geopolitical realities simplistically.

The idea has been gaining popularity in the United States of introducing a "code for superpower conduct" in the Third World with a view to scaling down superpower competition. There can be no objections to mutual understanding in relations with the United States, but notwithstanding all codes of conduct, would it not suffice for us to act in keeping with our own national interests? We can withdraw quite painlessly from the competition for "spheres of influece" imposed upon us by the United States in regions that are unimportant from the point of view of our security. Nor will our security suffer if the American leaders fail to show enough political vision or realism to take similar steps. How Americans go about using their national resources is their business, but our resources must be expended above all to improve living standards in this country. That is far more important from the point of view of national security than the course developments may take in some exotic country that many of us can barely find on the map of the world.

Putting our national interests first does not amount to selfishness or foregoing national ideals. We must not forget Marx's warning that the "idea" always disgraced itself insofar as it differed from the "interest." For some reason we have been inclined to the belief that this does not apply to the idea of socialism. It would seem that we shall be able to extend a great deal of real assistance to many developing nations if we set our own house in order and demonstrate again the viability of and the vast potential for self-advancement inherent in socialist society. It is not a fortuity that the appeal of our ideals has grown immensely throughout the world owing to the process of perestroika.

It is no doubt in our interest as well to secure an end to the arms race that has for a long time been a major economic burden for us, something that Washington counted on when it provoked us into entering one phase of the arms race after another. We are now hoping that we shall be able to break out of that vicious circle through negotiations on disarmament in real terms. But why do we have to secure the West's consent, so to speak, to go ahead with this or that move in this area if that move is in our own national interest! After all, we have said that we shall not be copying SDI however hard the Pentagon may try to involve us in such an adventure. What is preventing us from at least taking the very first steps toward alleviating the burden of the military budget? The margin of strategic strength that we have attained makes this quite possible.

* * *

The famous Lord Palmerston used to say that Britain has no eternal allies, and has no perpetual enemies, but eternal and perpetual interests. Mikhail Gorbachev has voiced agreement with that definition of the issue and it is up to all of us together to decide what constitutes our national interests and how we should go about assuring them.

Igor Malashenko
Cand. Sc. (Philosophy)

Learning to make decisions

Alexander Guber

Better a bitter truth than a show of prosperity

What was unusual about the recent session of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet? In what respect did it differ from previous ones? Its agenda included the plan and budget for next year and other points usually discussed by the Supreme Soviet. The distinctive feature should therefore be sought not in the agenda, but in the character of the discussion.

Ten years ago I was charged by my editor with the task of studying the work of the Supreme Soviet's permanent commissions. It could be inferred from the records that different opinions had been expressed at their meetings, ministers had been taken to task, and radical proposals had been made. The brevity of the sessions was then explained by the strenuous and prolonged debates in the permanent commissions.

But, taking a closer look at the work of the commissions, we had to state that the heated debates centred on trifles or, let us say, minor points. For instance, a project drawn up by certain ministries, the State Planning Committee and the Council of Ministers comes up for discussion by a Supreme Soviet's commission. Deputies talk not about approving or rejecting a project worth ten billion rubles, but about reducing its cost by ten or twenty million rubles. Such questions were seriously discussed in commissions and approved at sessions. In fact, the deputies automatically endorsed the decisions taken by the government apparatus.

Before the latest session, the work of commissions proceeded differently. The deputies knew that their proposals would be considered not some time later and not by government bodies, but at the session. This naturally influenced the content of discussions and their results. In particular, the session voted to increase the volume of retail trade by six billion rubles and cut down the volume of capital investment by more than three billion rubles. At the same time, two billion rubles' worth more production capacities will be introduced...

The main thing is that the projects became more balanced. Many of the internal contradictions and discrepancies between plans and their provision with resources had been removed in the course of discussion in the commissions. This work was continued at the session. As a result, the plan and the budget adopted by the Supreme Soviet compare more favourably with the drafts set out in the reports by the chairman of the State Planning Committee and the Finance Minister, which have already taken into account the remarks made by deputies in the commissions.

More important, however, was the school of decision making which even veteran deputies were going through for the first time. In the past, we often had a desire to avert our eyes from the screen when a Supreme Soviet session was televised. The most difficult editorial assignment was to write a story about a worker or collective farmer who had been elected a deputy. I also wrote about such deputies. Some of them were wonderful people, efficient workers. But it was impossible to write about them in earnest as politicians who could competently tackle economic, social or legal issues on a countrywide scale. When writing about this aspect of their activity, we engaged in wishful thinking. The art of running the country cannot be learned from textbooks alone. Practical work is needed too, at least of the kind done by deputies at the latest session and at the meetings of the commissions that preceded it. Never before have the lessons in such a school been so acute and open. For the first time not all decisions were unanimously adopted.

The deputies did not tell us anything we did not know or could not have guessed at. In the period of stagnation, what we knew differed from what we heard. That is why some people now think that there were no problems before, that the current problems have been caused by perestroika, and that their number is multiplying. But most people think differently. They understand that glasnost has not produced but highlighted problems, and that without it they cannot be solved. We prefer the truth, even the bitter truth, to a show of prosperity.

It was clearly stated at the session that a budget deficit and a reduction of foreign trade could not be avoided in the present circumstances. Nevertheless, it seemed to me that deputies did not always call a spade a spade in evaluating the economic situation. They spoke plainly more often than before, but not always.

Let us take, for instance, the report on the plan for 1989. It follows from it that the situation in the retail trade has improved considerably: the volume of trade has risen 2.5 times more than the average for the first two years of the five-year-plan period. In the last few months I have visited the Ukraine, the Transcaucasian republics and the Far East. In none of these regions, as in Moscow, have I met a man who shares this optimism with regard to trade.

True, having pointed to the growth of retail trade, the speaker dwelt on problems encountered by the customers. The point is that we ordinary customers have nothing to do with the volume of trade. More and more often we do not find the goods we want to buy in a shop, or we learn that their prices have risen. The volume of trade in terms of money can be increased with fewer goods, simply by raising the prices of goods.

The figures showing the growth of real incomes and retail trade will be poor consolation for the man who tries in vain to buy a pair of shoes, ordinary thread, or a windscreen for his car.

Shortly after the war a famous clown was victimized because in one of his jokes he advised the audience to enjoy the good things of life vicariously, by listening to bombastic radio programmes. Indeed, at the time there was no other way to enjoy the good things of life. Today no one need be afraid to tell even more bitter jokes. However, the habit of consoling oneself with carefully selected statistics has proved more enduring than fear.

The place of Soviets in our power structure

A discussion of the new election bill has begun. What new features does it include? What is the relationship to be between local Party bodies and local Soviets?

"The Party seeks to **guide** the activities of the Soviets but not to replace them," the Resolution of the 8th Party Congress of 1919 says in part. The problem of the division of functions between Party and state bodies arose at the inception of the first socialist state. It appeared on the agenda of all major Party forums but did not find effective solution until recently. The Party became involved in tackling a wide variety of managerial issues, which was regarded as natural in enhancing the guiding role of the CPSU. The duplication of management functions inexorably led to an inordinate growth in the number of apparatchiks.

Executive and administrative bodies took full responsibility for decisions on basic issues, leaving only the formal endorsement of official decisions to the deputies. The principle that would have ensured extensive grass roots involvement in running the country was never implemented. Moreover, the deputies not only found themselves removed from effective decision making, but also to a large extent lost contact with the electorate. In 1987 97 per cent of the Moscow Soviet deputies and 99.6 per cent of the deputies to Moscow district Soviets polled by sociologists had never spoken at sessions on behalf of their voters. Only 3 per cent of the Moscow Soviet deputies and 5 per cent of the deputies to district Soviets polled said they kept the electorate informed on questions that came up before the Soviets. Hence the loss of any sense of responsibility to the electorate. One might also mention inadequate funding for local government and the inefficient performance of the corps of deputies, which was for a long time formed on orders "from above." A role was also played by the ingrained psychology on the part of deputies to be dependent not only on the principal Party and state bodies but also on their own apparatus.

But the most serious danger to democratization is posed by the phenomenon which was described in the report at the Party Conference as "...a simplified, reduced image of socialist democracy where the actual exercise of power is identified not with active political involvement on the part of the working people but above all with the executive bodies."

The blueprint for changing the structure of government bodies provides for the establishment at local Soviets at territory, region, district, town and neighbourhood levels of a new organ, the presidium of the Soviet, and the election of the chairman of the Soviet, in all Soviets. The objective is to ensure deputies' independence of the apparatus. For the presidium (elected by the Soviet and made up of deputies) to fulfil its purpose, it should be subject **only** to the Soviet. Any external pressure on it should be ruled out.

To ensure the continuous character of its work for the Soviet, the presidium should perhaps function as a standing body. Apart form the chairman of the Soviet, the vice-chairmen and the secretary of the presidium, as well as the chairpersons of the standing commissions, other deputies too could be elected to it. It would not be unreasonable in this case to renew the composition of the body at certain intervals (once a year, for example). Such continuity would porovide every deputy with the opportunity to sit on this body for some time during any period of convocation.

The presidium's functions should necessarily be confined exclusively to organizational and control activities (organizing the work of the Soviet, its standing commissions and deputies, and monitoring the work of the executive personnel). A control function on the part of the Soviet will also be necessary to watch over the activities of the presidium (for example, at each session the Soviet hears out the report of the presidium and has the right to quash decisions made by the presidium and the chairman of the Soviet). Draft resolutions of the Soviet worked out by the presidium are also to be discussed by the standing commissions.

The concept of the powers of the chairman of the Soviet and those of Party leader merging in one person in the highest echelons of government endorsed at the special session of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet does not question the validity of this. The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet should possess presidential powers, as deal with representing the country in the international arena and adopting decisions with regard to major national problems.

First secretary – chairman of the Soviet: a flexible approach

As for local level, the situation there is quite different. Here the change in the structure of the Soviet is dictated primarily by the need to enhance the representative element, increase the importance of the corps of deputies in making decisions on basic questions concerning regional development, and countervail the determining effect of the executive personnel on the overall range of work done by the Soviets. It is for this reason that the functions of the chairman of the Soviet and the presidium should be confined to the organizational sphere, as they are called on to ensure the normal work of the Soviet as a representative body of government. The presidium should in no sense substitute for the Soviet, otherwise we shall again revert to the situation which we now have, with the sole difference that we shall have the presidium of the Soviet instead of today's executive committee. Therefore the law should stipulate that the presidium and the chairman of the local Soviet have no right to

make final decisions on questions that come under the jurisdiction of the Soviet.

The election of the first secretary of the local Party committee as chairman of the Soviet will unquestionably consolidate the importance of this post and bolster it with the authority of the Party body, particularly given established traditions (all major questions are decided by the most important figure in the region) and the prevalent psychological stereotype of deputy work (formal endorsement of the decisions that have already been made). To be sure, it would be tempting at the initial phase while the old concepts are being reviewed to support the Soviets with the authority of the Party. But, on the other hand, aren't we thus prolonging the life of such stereotypes?

A flexible approach seems to be most reasonable here. Certainly, first secretaries are bound to be elected at some local Soviets, but other options must also become valid. Then we shall be able to choose a truly optimal model. The more so as, out of more than 52 thousand local Soviets, over 46 thousand are rural Soviets not provided with territorial Party organs on their level. This in itself should rule out "rigid regulation."

The deputy's independence

When determining the role of the executive committee, one should proceed from the premise that its objective is to carry out the decisions of the Soviet. The Soviet's executive committee should be a body responsible for executive work. It is this variant which is envisaged in the draft law of the U.S.S.R. "On Changes and Supplements to the Constitution" (the Basic Law of the U.S.S.R.) now being discussed nationwide, which stipulates that persons who sit on executive committees of local Soviets, heads of departments and boards of executive committees cannot be elected as deputies to the Soviets to which they are subordinate. I have reservations, however, with regard to the exception made in the bill for the chairmen of executive committees. I think that the groundwork principle should apply to this category too.

Anatoly Solovyov, a doctor, Anatoly Klimov, a teacher, and Alexander Lebed, a designer, contested one seat in the Moscow Soviet from the Baumansky district of the capital, with Anatoly Solovyov winning most of the votes.

Photo by M. Kovalev

One should also point to the antiquated character of the organizational forms that regulate the work of the deputies with their extreme orderliness and rigid restrictions. This uniformity of organizational procedures has proved invalid in practice and led to the spread of formalism and the jettisoning of their democratic content. Should, for that matter, the law stipulate the number of sessions to be held? If the Soviet were to decide major questions of economic and social development solely at its sessions, then their number and duration would depend on the specific conditions in a given territory and, among other things, on the level of the Soviet. So for the Soviets of small-size administrative-territorial units, it would be more suitable to convene sessions relatively more often, say, once a month. For larger territories a different scheme would be more appropriate (say, four times a year), that is, sessions held at longer intervals, but for lengthier periods of duration.

The question of how efficiently a deputy works is closely related to the conditions for relieving him of his professional duties for the duration of a sesion. I suggest that the expenses for this period should be covered from the budget of the relevant local Soviet rather than funded by enterprises or organizations. This measure will consolidate the independence of the deputy.

It is high time we radically changed our approach to the established model of a deputy's activity and indeed to the very image of the deputy. A petitioner and an appellant should be a plenipotentiary representative of the people who voted for him. The effective laws on the status of people's deputies provide in the main for recommendational and informational functions for him. The deputy as a representative of government should be vested with powers to make binding decisions which, if unobserved, should entail bringing to book either the persons or the organizations responsible.

One important objective in enhancing the efficiency of the Soviets is improving the qualitative composition of people's representation. A serious step in this direction is the new election law (the first draft election law has been presented for nationwide discussion). The law will give the electorate real opportunities to influence the qualitative composition of the deputy corps. This presupposes a high degree of the electorate's political activity.

The question of the optimum numerical size of the corps of deputies in every Soviet needs further study and elaboration. Though there are no reliable criteria for determining an optimum number of deputies, it is clear that the now existing corps of deputies (except, perhaps in rural Soviets) are too large for the rational organization of work. The authority to decide this issue should be granted to the Soviets themselves after having defined an upper and lower limit respectively for the Soviet at each level.

Three conditions of sovereignty

The theoretical and legal delimitation of functions between Party and state bodies is only the first step on the way to the sovereignty of the Soviets. They should further be given real opportunities to exercise sovereignty. For this purpose,

at least three conditions should be observed.

First, the democratization of the work of the Soviets themselves, based on developing territorial self-government and drawing the population into the decision making process.

Secondly, improving the financial position of the Soviets through the extensive introduction of territorial economic accounting.

Thirdly and lastly, creating possibilities for the self-maintenance of the area and for the satisfaction of the needs of the resident population.

Territorial self-government

Every voter should have a real opportunity to have a say in working out decisions made by the Soviet and its bodies and influence their implementation, and he should be confident that the opinions of citizens, work collectives, residents' meetings and rural gatherings will be heeded and will be crucial in making decisions relating to the needs of the population.

All this can only be ensured by a legal mechanism binding the decision making process and taking into account public opinion. The development of such a mechanism is being initiated by the law on the nationwide discussion of major issues with regard to the whole of the Soviet Union, but in practice its application at regional level still leaves much to be desired. The electorate must be given the opportunity to be present when the Soviets are in session, and at meetings of executive committees and standing commissions.

Financial independence

A considerable section of the social system serving the population in local areas is funded through the budgets of local Soviets. There is a perpetual shortage of these funds due to "the residual principle" in financing, and to earmarking funds "by rule of thumb," according to established tradition or mere whim.

The new economic conditions will make it possible to establish a direct tie between the budget of the Soviet and the operation of enterprises located on the territory controlled by the Soviet in question.

Under the system of economic accounting, the financial basis of local government will be built up from the funds assigned by state enterprises and cooperative organizations, in accordance with their profit rate on the basis of stable norms. A new source of income replenishing local budgets will be payment for the resources (labour, natural and other) made use of by the enterprises, including fines for squandering them and for the pollution of the environment.

It would be only fair to set aside a proportion of the allocations from the enterprise's social developoment funds for the budget of the Soviet. The workers at the enterprise live on its territory and enjoy all the social amenities it provides.

The most important thing is to have for this purpose economically and socially based norms that take local conditions into account, making it possible to determine in what degree each enterprise is participating in the overall development of the area.

Self-support of the territories

The question of the relationship between the Soviet and the enterprises located on its territory was justifiably regarded as one of the most difficult ones. This problem proved central to the solution of a great many issues concerning the self-support of the territories. The poor material base of the Soviets gave rise to the theory that local government should have its "own" enterprises under its control. The Soviets took charge of the enterprises whose products had to do with satisfying the local population's needs. This arrangement, repeatedly formalized and put within strict time frames, has failed to work. It has not been implemented to this day, and the efforts that had to be put to ensure the normal operation of "their own" enterprises failed to pay off because of the poor levels of efficiency of the Soviets.

Now the situation is radically changing. All enterprises, regardless of the authority to which they are subordinate, must allocate funds to the local government budget. The question arises whether under the circumstances the Soviet really needs to take charge of the operation of industrial enterprises? The purpose of the Soviet as a body of government lies elsewhere, it must primarily provide a preferential regime for the economic activity of all enterprises (both state and cooperative), coordinate their work to ensure the comprehensive development of the territory and facilitate the satisfaction of the needs of its population.

This approach does not rule out other possibilities. If need be, the Soviet may initiate and control the establishment of territorial-industrial amalgamations, cooperatives and other economic structures. What is important is that the process should stem from vital needs given these particular conditions and on this particular territory. The command-administrative method that used to thrive in this sphere too has proved invalid here as well.

Things are different with the social sector (municipal economy, housing, transport). The advantage of their direct subordination to the Soviet is evident. Control over the social amenities system will be concentrated under one authority and nor will responsibility be dissipated over various departments.

Elena Korenevskaya
LLD

In the context of perestroika, such questions as state structure, especially the Constitution and the electoral system, are of critical importance. Similarly significant are freedom of association and assembly, and such traditional issues as freedom of conviction and the free choice of country of residence.

On October 22-23, Soviet newspapers carried draft amendments to **the U.S.S.R. Constitution and electoral law.** It has been announced that, after a month-long discussion, they will be presented to the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet for endorsement. I must confess that I am worried by such haste in so serious a matter. The Constitution and electoral law define the country's political structure for years to come, and any mistake here is fraught with unpredictable consequences. We should therefore make quite sure that all factors have been taken into consideration so that there is no casting of votes for a list drawn up by officials in elections to the Supreme Soviet, as in that case the popularly elected deputies will not be able to discharge their functions.

There is likewise a need to make provision in Supreme Soviet representation for new public organizations, including any that might appear in the foreseeable future. Why is there no place on the list of organizations empowered to nominate deputies to the Soviets for the popular fronts currently emerging in the different constituent republics? I think it would be beneficial to extend the period of discussion by, say, three months, as within this period independent teams of experts could clarify and complement the drafts. Why not call an all-union referendum as provided for in the Constitution? Another reason I suggest this is that, in the last few months the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet has, by a majority vote, endorsed edicts concerned with the procedure for holding meetings and demonstrations and with the powers enjoyed by the troops of the Ministry of the Interior. They have, however, been criticized in the news media, by legal experts and in the Supreme Soviet itself...

The concept of a **law-governed state** implies, above all, the preeminence of the law. All instances, all state bodies, all persons, however high their office, are equal with all citizens in the eyes of the law. In turn, the laws fully conform to, and do not conflict with, the Constitution, and

The article by Andrei Sakharov, member of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, will appear in full in our supplement, "Perestroika and human rights" to be sent to our subscribers in December.

Towards democracy

Academician *Andrei Sakharov*



Photo by Yuri Rost

likewise fully accord with international norms and the country's international commitments... Indeed, international commitments must necessarily come first and they may be directly invoked, even in the case of judicial rulings and decisions. There must also be due and appropriate constitutional control and supervision in the shape of a constitutional court or other analogous body that would ensure that legislation accords with the Constitution and international commitments. The Committee of Constitutional Supervision envisaged by the draft constitutional amendments could be such a body. The entire system for appealing against judicial decisions and rulings also stands in need of revision. Incidentally, it is important to enhance the standard of jurisprudence, as all transgressions and abuses of the law in the process of interrogation must necessarily be identified. All interrogation conducted by unlawful means must be declared illegal. It must be established that the defendant's confession has no legal force, as then the interrogating officer will not attempt to elicit a confession, which is often coerced by unlawful means.

In a law-governed state the rights of citizens must be protected unconditionally.

Freedom of conviction. We had and indeed still have articles in our criminal code in conformity with which people have been sentenced for their conviction or for non-violent action associated therewith. Most of these people have been released, and it is now necessary to release and reinstate all such persons.

How the appropriate articles of the new criminal code are formulated is important. So far we only have sketchy information as to how this code is being drafted. Apparently Article 190, Section 1, of the Russian Federation Criminal Code is to be dropped, as has been noted in the Soviet media. I think it essential to state precisely that criminal prosecution for one's convictions and for non-violent action associated therewith is intolerable. I think this should be reflected in the Fundamentals of U.S.S.R. Criminal Legislation.

I also think the "religious" articles should be so worded as to prevent harassment for non-violent action relating to beliefs and religious convictions.

Free choice of country of residence. Soviet law, at any rate Soviet practice, declares that with us emigration is admissible in the case of the reunion of families, for which purpose what are known as invitations are required.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the human rights treaties that the Soviet Union has ratified imply the totally unrestricted right to choose one's country of residence. This right is unrestricted in the sense that no conditions are required other than the person's own wish. Naturally, in cases when exit is denied for reason of national security, the authorities are entitled to refuse permission. That is reasonable and provision should be made for it in Soviet legislation. This must all be strictly legalized and it must be possible to appeal to the law courts against such decisions, as each denial must be justified.

Freedom of assembly and demonstrations. The only constitutional solution to this problem in a given case would be one according to which citizens notify local government bodies of a forthcoming assembly or demonstration. Meanwhile, the authorities should take steps to ensure that such assemblies proceed with due observance of law and order, allowing nobody to obstruct them. However, if they believe that the said meeting should be forbidden, such a ban should be justified.

National problems and problems of the national-state constitutional structure of the U.S.S.R. In its initial version, the U.S.S.R. Constitution was drafted in the 1920s, and subsequently in the 1930s in conditions when considerable aberrations already existed in state structure.

The state's national structure conforms to the hierarchical principle of the branching-tree type. The picture is one of the state, followed by the constituent republics and such autonomous formations as republics, regions and national areas administratively subordinated to it. In itself this system gives rise to acute national contradictions and problems, insofar as minorities and ethnic groups have found themselves subordinated to larger ethnic groups.

As I see it, the new, modified Constitution should introduce not a hierarchical system of links, but what is known as a horizontal one, incorporating a central supranational government and equal formations based on national characteristics, though not necessarily equal in size and level of development.

The right of citizens to control and supervise state decisions. Millions of destinies hinge on the implementation of this right. It relates to decisions taken on social and economic issues, as, for instance, price reform, and likewise on matters of foreign policy. I maintain, for instance, that such decisions as the sending of Soviet troops into Afghanistan should not have been taken without discussion, without popular involvement.

Dissidents and society. Today the moral condition of our society is changing drastically. It is being shaken up. People are being deluged with information about what really happened in this country and what is happening now. I see this as a cleansing, purging factor, which must help us, or at least the young, to acquire a more democratic mentality. That, in turn, implies respect for people who think differently, as well as the desire to take stock of everything for oneself without blind faith in authority. Society needs its dissidents. Generally, I want to say that only ideas can conflict with ideas.

■

Motherland, home, people

Bohuslav Kucera

The working people in Czechoslovakia have widely celebrated the 70th anniversary of independence

The history of every nation has its own, somewhat erratic dynamic. There are sometimes very long periods in the history of the country when things develop calmly and smoothly, without sudden leaps and changes. At the same time history at some periods is characterized by events that bring outstanding problems and dissatisfactions to the forefront and the people's life begins to change rapidly. Each nation constantly returns to the critical points of its history, learning lessons in order to apply them in the future.

In the history of the Czech and Slovak peoples, there are a number of such crucial points. Here too belong the events associated with October 28, 1918, a day that became enshrined in the memory of our citizens. This is the day that restored Czech and Slovak statehood and brought into being the Chechoslovak state, which proved the greatest success and major victory of the national liberation forces. On this day the Czechs after three centuries and the Slovaks after a thousand years of oppression wrestled back power on their own soil and were once again able to say: this is my home, my native land. It is free at last! This victory, the result of a centuries-long struggle for national independence, was possible due to the revolutionary changes in the world at the end of the first world war, changes with their centre in Petrograd. This victory was also facilitated by the national resistance forces, both at home and outside the country led by Tomas Masaryk.

Talking about all this, however, I would not wish to pass over in silence the fact that the republic born on October 28, 1918, failed to live up to all the hopes and expectations harboured by the people at the moment of its birth. Particularly in the social sphere it lagged far behind the demands advanced by the masses of the people who had called for a "socialist nation" during the demonstration on May 1, 1918. Their call was backed by the Socialist Council formed by the Czechoslovak Socialist Party and the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Workers' Party. They were joined by the workers who, on October 14, 1918, went on a general strike. The bourgeois republic, however, had neither the will nor the strength to satisfy their demand.

The demonstration of working people in Vaclav Square in Prague on October 27

From the newspaper Rude Pravo

Naturally, we are aware that October 28, 1918, is not the only turning point in our contemporary national history. We also regard the climax of the national liberation struggle and the liberation of Czechoslovakia in May 1945, as well as the choice of a socialist course of development in February 1948, as key moments. Without May 1945, without the triumph of the liberation mission carried out by the Soviet Army, without the heroic epic of the anti-fascist resistance on the part of the Czechs and the Slovaks October 28, 1918 would have been a mere episode which would doubtlessly have been trampled into the ground by the boots of the nazi barbarians. And if it had not been for February 1948, we would not have had a society of social justice, a socialist society, in Czeshoslovakia.

October 28 is associated in our history not only with the formation of an independent state of Czechs and Slovaks. October 28, 1945, is the day marking the entry into force of the Decree on Nationalization, which in large measure undermined the pattern of bourgeois society. October 28, 1968, saw the promulgation of the constitutional law on the Czechoslovak Federation that consolidated the equality of Czechs and Slovaks in a single state.

The socialist reality of our republic shows that the hopes that inspired our people in the social and national-liberation struggle have been fulfilled.

We appreciate what we have achieved and are aware that the road to it has not been easy. There have been hardships, mistakes and delusions. And in marking the 70th anniversary of the formation of our state we not only turn to the historic events of the past but also look through the prism of the years at our life today in our home, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, a developed socially, economically and culturally democratic socialist state.

PRAGUE

Bohuslav Kucera – Chairman of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party, Deputy Chairman of the Federal Assembly of Czechoslovakia

The Pyongyang miracle

From our special correspondents
Boris Balkarei and Albert Pin

Why they build so fast in North Korea

"Next stop – Yongwan"... The train starts moving and in a couple of seconds dives into a tunnel. Soft lights on the ceiling provide the illumination. At the top of the carriage is a portrait of Kim Il Sung.

At four in the afternoon there are not many passengers. Children in school uniforms with pioneer scarves round their necks. A young mother with her baby strapped to her back. A couple of men in dark trouseres and light shirts...

"The Pyongyang underground was opened in 1973," the station master at the next stop told us. "We now have two lines making a total length of 35 km., with 17 stations. They are decorated with murals and frescoes depicting scenes from the glorious revolutionary history of the Korean people and their flourishing life under the wise guidance of their leader. The architectural style of each station is different. Marble, granite and chandeliers..."

"How many people travel by underground?"

"More than 20,000 pass through our station daily. The underground opens at 5 a.m. and closes at 11 p.m. In the rush hours the interval between trains is 2-3 minutes and the rest of the time, 5 minutes. The number of carriages per train also changes – from 5-6 during rush hours to 3-4 the rest of the time."

"Are all the carriages made in your country?"

"Some are Chinese-made."

"Does the underground pay its way?"

"No, it is subsidized by the state."

The train drew up at Yongwan station. ("Yongwan" means "Glory"). As we stepped out of the carriage we found ourselves in the middle of the Taedong River, which divides Pyongyang into two sections. On either side there were huge mosaics (4 metres high, 80 metres in length) of the city with its numerous palaces, theatres, museums, monuments, wide streets and squares, parks and new high-rise buildings...

"Each square metre," our guide explained, "is made up of ten thousand pieces of mosaic."

We walked the length of the station twice, admiring the patience and meticulous workmanship of the artists who had created this Pyongyang miracle.

Although the station was completed only last year, the mosaics did not show some of the landmarks of the city already pointed out to us by our hospitable hosts. That was not surprising, as construction work in Pyongyang is not only excellent in quality, but surprisingly quick...

The pace

...It took the lift a mere minute and a half to carry us to the viewing platform of the monument to chuchae ideas standing on the Taedong Embankment in the centre of Pyongyang. Our young, pleasant woman guide had told us that the monument was erected in 1982 to mark the 70th birthday of the founder of the immortal chuchae ideas, President Kim Il Sung, and was built in under two years on the initiative of Kim Jong Il (Secretary of the CC of the Workers' Party of Korea and son of Kim Il Sung. – **Auth.**) and under his wise leadership, thanks to the selfless labour of numerous building workers and their helpers.

From this dizzy height we looked down on the city. The only thing higher than us was the 20-metre flame at the top of the monument representing the light of the chuchae ideas, and the sky...

"Over there, in the middle of the river on either side of the monument," our guide went on to explain, "two big fountains have been built. They throw up 20 tons of water to a height of 150 metres..."

It is hard to find words to describe the marvelous panorama that opens up from

the viewing platform of the white-granite monument. What should be noted is that it took only twenty-one months to build the palace on the opposite bank of the river. It is known as the Palace of Education, and has 600 rooms and other lecture halls covering a total floor space of 100,000 sq. m. Decorated in marble, it too was completed in 1982. It took only just as long to put up the Arc de Triomphe, opened at a special ceremony on the 70th birthday of the leader of the D.P.R.K. It stands in the centre of the city – 60 metres high and 50 metres wide, thus making it bigger, as local guides point out, than the one in Paris...

Such is the pace and scale of construction in Pyongyang. The 8-kilometre dam at the mouth of the Taedong River, which runs into the Yellow Sea, complete with locks, railway line and highway, by local standards was probably built at a slower pace – it took 5 years. It was commissioned in June 1986.

Now the builders are mainly concentrating on the south-west of Pyongyang, where two years ago work was started on the big new residential district of Kwanbok. It is expected that 100,000 people will find homes in its 25,000 flats. In addition, the district will have unique sports facilities and a number of public buildings. It is to be completed in time for the 13th World Youth and Student Festival to take place next summer, but already about three quarters of the work has been done.

The skyscrapers of Kwanbok

Kwanbok

Imagine a newly paved highway about 6 kilometres long and 100 metres wide. On either side it is lined by tall buildings with plenty of space between them. Their silhouettes look finished but to judge from the busy people working near the temporary railway line bringing in building materials, there is still plenty to do.

"Yes," confirmed Om Gi U, chief of one of the five departments of Pyongyang's Chief Building Administration. "But everything will be completed in time..."

As usual, Om Gi U began his description of the job by showing us a model of the new district and citing facts and figures. There will be 60 blocks of flats – ranging from 5 to 42 storeys. This includes two 42-storey buildings, eight 35-storey, two 33-storey, and fifteen 30-storey buildings. The high-rise buildings determine the skyline of all nine sub-districts, each of which will include a school, a kindergarten, creche, shops, canteen and various services... There will also be a circus. Actually, a circus village, as it will consist of five buildings, then a children's club that can cater simultaneously for 5,000 boys and girls, and a 33-storey youth hotel...

That is not all. The sports facilities will include 10 big halls that can host contests in all the main fields of sport, a stadium seating 25,000 and a hotel for athletes and tourists. Finally, one other very important thing – the underground is to be extended, with four stations on the main street of the district. And a new highway will link Kwanbok with the centre of Pyongyang.

The first tenants will move into Kwanbok next year. But first two of the sub-districts will be used to house the participants in the Youth Festival – about 20,000 youngsters are expected from many countries of the world. The flats in the new district are spacious and modern, usually consisting of 3-4 rooms with a total floor space of 110 sq. metres. So one can easily imagine the joy of those who will be moving into them. The architects have also designed bigger flats for two or three closely related families. They have six rooms and a total floor space of 180 metres. This makes it possible for grandparents to live with their adult children and grandchildren (it should be noted that in Pyongyang there are still quite a number of people in need of better housing – mostly those who occupy the small postwar houses, which did not have all the proper amenities).

Om Gi U himself hopes to become a tenant in Kwanbok. He is a builder by trade and followed in his father's footsteps. His father was an excellent specialist, although he never got a college education. Om Gi U, however, graduated from the Pyongyang Building College 16 years ago. He worked on the construction of several of the capital's streets. He is married, his wife is a teacher, and they have two children. At present they live in a two-room flat – 70 sq. m. of floor space. Om Gi U would like his daughter to be a teacher as well; not, however, in a general education school, but at a building technical school. "Then," he said, "I shall be able to pass on my experience, and she in turn will tell the new generation how their fathers and grandfathers worked."

We asked Om Gi U how he explained the very successful work of the builders of Kwanbok and the fast pace of construction.

"Our beloved leader Kim Jong Il personally examined numerous versions of the plan and chose the best. Then he formed a construction project headquarters consisting of the best specialists and headed by the First Secretary of the City Party Committee. In the course of a year 1,000-odd architects and planners prepared all the blueprints. Work started simultaneously on practically all the components.

A few more details that we learnt from Om Gi U and other builders we met in Kwanbok. Half the people working on the

construction project are residents of Pyongyang, a third are soldiers in the People's Army, and another 9,000 are from all provinces of the republic who form nine construction units, each with responsibility for work on a special section. So all in all, at least 45,000 people are engaged in the project. Work continues from morning to evening, with work in some sections done in two or even three shifts. The youngsters from the provinces and the soldiers live as a rule in temporary quarters near the building site. An 8-hour working day is the rule.

Each of the nine construction units from the provinces are divided into two companies of 500 persons. Each has its own special job. Park Don Hwang, leader of the 1st company of the unit for North Pyongan Province, showed us a fine badminton hall seating 3,000, and a sports palace built by his company in less than 2 years (from August 1986 to April of this year). The unit's 2nd company worked on housing construction. The majority of the builders from the 1st company have now joined the second.

But it's not builders alone who are building Kwanbok. Hundreds of thousands of citizens of the republic, people of different professions are helping in their own way: by monetary contributions from their wages (as, incidentally, for other major national projects) and with gifts of food, clothing and so on. The capital's industrial and office workers also pitch in by doing volunteer work.

Individual volunteers – young people who express the wish to work during their holidays (which do not exceed 15 days) are also welcome. At one cooperative in the town of Sariwon, about 100 km. from Pyongyang, we were told of a young couple who decided to spend their honeymoon working in Kwanbok. The cooperative learned of this patriotic act from the chiefs of the construction project.

But to return to our conversation with Om Gi U. We did not ask the cost of the project with its fine architectural ensembles, skyscrapers and dozens of sports palaces. Evidently estimating the cost would not be a simple task. Om Gi U did, however, underline that everything was being built by the North Koreans themselves and all the construction materials and equipment, including the lifts for the skyscrapers, were Korean-made. This also applied to other construction projects in Pyongyang: the proportion of foreign-made equipment did not exceed 0.1 per cent. The only exception was the 47-storey hotel going up in the centre of the capital (also for the World Festival), which was being built jointly with a French company.

To the building site...

Panorama

In addition to the skyscrapers and palaces of Kwanbok, a number of other major new buildings are to go up in Pyongyang in time for the festival. Many of them would deserve a place on the 80-metre mosaics in Yongwan underground station. But that, clearly, is no longer possible, since it would mean remaking that Pyongyang marvel...

But they are worth listing at least in other to fill in the overall picture of the capital of the D.P.R.K. They include a 105-storey hotel, the highest in the world. Two more theatres – one of them a youth theatre in eastern Pyongyang and another bridge spanning the Taedong. The biggest cinema in Asia, with six halls, the biggest of which can seat an audience of 2,000, an international communications centre, two more stadiums – a football stadium seating 30,000 and a sports arena with covered stands seating 150,000 (Pyongyang already has an excellent stadium seating 100,000, reconstructed in 1982 and named after Kim Il Sung).

Pyongyang's main sports arena is being built on the Neunna Island. We arrived there towards evening, having crossed the Taedong River along a specially built temporary dyke. Having passed through the gates, our car stopped on the future track. Girls were weeding the football field, while builders were busy everywhere. Some were laying concrete on the stands, others were removing the formworks, while welders were busy on the framework of the roof... Somewhere a band was playing, and from somewhere else we could hear a voice announcing over a loudspeaker the names of those who had worked well, as well as those who should pull up their socks and do better.

From a member of the Political Department, Park Pyun Bin, we learned that the stadium was being built by a party shock brigade made up of the best workers from all nine provinces of the republic and ministry staffs. All in all, 4,000 people. They lived in hostels closeby, just across the river. The first shift worked from 8 a.m. to 7 p.m., with a two-hour lunch break. It was this party brigade that had built the monument to the ideas of chuchae, the Palace of Congresses, reconstructed the cemetery of revolutionaries on Mount Taesong, and the Kim Il Sung Stadium at the foot of Mount Moran...

Park Pyun Bin, who is on the staff of the City Party Committee, has worked with the brigade for over 8 years. He told us that it was a great honour to be taking part in building the big sports arena where the opening and closing ceremonies of the World Youth and Student Festival would take place. Work on it had begun in September 1986 and was now nearing completion.

We drove from Neunna Island with a column of heavy lorries that left a trailing cloud of dust in their wake. From the distance we could hear slogans being proclaimed. Our faithful Korean guide translated for our benefit: "At any cost we must fulfil the instructions of our beloved leader Kim Jong Il! Devotion to our leader is everyone's duty!"

PYONGYANG-MOSCOW

Photos by authors

Factors for national rebirth

The events that preceded the rebirth of the Polish state in November 1918 have been interpreted in different ways. A New Times reporter discussed them with Prof. **Andrzej GARLICKI,** Dean of Warsaw University's history department

New Times. To those unfamiliar with Poland's history, the 70th anniversary of the rebirth of its statehood might seem just another red-letter date. Those who take the trouble to study Poland's history will find it difficult to understand how, in a partitioned country, the people could have preserved the sense of nationhood, a sense that helped them to restore Poland to integral and sovereign statehood.

Andrzej Garlicki. Poland ceased to be independent as a result of its partitioning between Russia, Austria and Prussia in 1772, 1793 and 1795. The refusal of Poles to tolerate partition was an essential factor in the shaping of the public consciousness that united the inhabitants of the three annexed territories. The popular uprisings – in 1794, led by Kosciuszko, in November 1830, and in January 1863 – were important for national consolidation. Practically every generation of Poles sacrificed their lives in the struggle for Poland, as they did not accept the partitioning of their country.

The latter half of the 19th and the early 20th century saw the emergence of political movements in Poland, the formation of political parties of workers, peasants, the bourgeoisie and the clergy. It also saw the accelerated consolidation of all Poles as a nation in the modern sense of the word, because in the past only the Polish gentry and intelligentsia had felt their national affiliation. Mention should here be made of the Russian revolution of 1905 which literally shook the Kingdom of Poland and proved a milestone on the road to the liberation of that country.

N.T. Incidentally, the revolution of 1905 showed Poles that the Russian empire was not so unbreakable after all.

A.G. It did indeed. The Poles naturally took the side of the Russian revolutionaries. This contributed to the awakening of all strata of society, particularly the workers and peasants. Formerly, a Polish peasant identified with the place where he lived, not with his native land as a whole. It is thanks to the revolution of 1905, his participation in the struggle against enforced Russification and the campaign to introduce Polish in rural elementary schools that he became aware of his Polish nationality. The same process was observed in the territories annexed by Prussia. The policy of Germanization had led to diametrically opposite results – a dramatically increased struggle for the preservation of national culture, the Polish language, etc.

N.T. What role did the October Socialist Revolution play in winning Poland's independence and its establishment as a state?

A.G. The October 1917 Revolution was undoubtedly an event of immense importance for us. However, a professional historian should not take a narrow approach. We often read in mass publications that independence was brought to Poland by the October Revolution. This statement is incomplete and is likely to produce a negative reaction in the minds of Poles.

Poland certainly owes much to the October Revolution. But the events that preceded independence had been tremendously influenced by a whole range of factors, the entire development of Russia in 1917 among them. We believe that the February Revolution and the overthrow of tsarism initiated a powerful social process, the culmination of which was the October Revolution.

The overthrow of the autocracy was beyond doubt a decisive factor in the liberation of Poland. Following it, the Petrograd Soviet – a fact rarely mentioned in mass publications – recognized Poland's right to independence. True, the provisional government undermined this right with many reservations and restrictions, as for instance, the demand that Poland conclude a military alliance with Russia. Nevertheless, it was the overthrow of tsarism that did away with the major obstacle to the solution of the Polish problem.

N.T. What was that obstacle?

A.G. During the first world war, tsarism emphatically stressed that the Polish issue was the exclusive concern of Russia. For that reason the other Entente states had no intention whatever of discussing it without Petersburg's consent. The overthrow of tsarism removed this obstacle. No wonder that initial steps were soon taken in France to form a Polish army, and a Polish national committee was also set up there. The committee was recognized by all the states in the coalition, the United States included, not as a government but as a form of representation of the Polish people. In other words, the process of legalizing the

Handing out arms to people during the national uprising in Poznan in 1918.
Painting by Leon Prazinski

Polish issue began on an international scale.

True, this process did not affect Poland, as it was occupied by German and Austro-Hungarian armies. For that reason, the liberation declarations addressed to the Poles had more ideological than practical significance.

To this it should be added that the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk provided for the annexation of Polish territories by Germany. The Poles understood that it was an inequitable and extortionate treaty dictated by the tragic situation in which the newborn Soviet Republic had found itself. In any case, the conclusion of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk made it impossible for the Soviet government to deal with Polish affairs. That is why the declaration of Poland's independence, adopted on August 29, 1918 – almost a year after the October Revolution – only acquired practical significance after the Brest Treaty had been annulled.

N.T. You've mentioned a whole range of factors that contributed to the rebirth of the Polish state.

A.G. Today Polish historians identify three groups of such factors. These are, in chronological order: first, the overthrow of tsarism and all the repercussions of the great revolutionary process in Russia; second, the military defeat of the central European states; and third, the ability of Polish society to make active use of these favourable external circumstances.

N.T. The third group of factors therefore includes the awareness of national unity by practically all sections of the population, and the role of the political movements...

A.G. That's right. But to this should be added the role of Polish culture, which had never dissolved into German, Russian or Austrian culture, always remaining Polish to the core.

N.T. What about the role of religion?

A.G. This is a very important question. Unless we answer it, we shall be unable to understand the process of national liberation and present-day Poland. The political influence of the Roman Catholic Church in the Polish territories increased tremendously in the 19th century. In the circumstances that had then arisen, it assumed some government functions, as the state did not exist. While in most European countries the role of the Church had weakened, an opposite was true of Poland. The Roman Catholic Church was almost the main factor in the consolidation of Poles as a nation. This explains the unswerving adherence of the Polish people to Catholicism.

N.T. Have we not forgotten one more factor – personal, so to say? I have in mind Józef Pilsudski. Many think that the head of the Polish state played a substantial part in the preparation, development and especially the completion of the process we are considering here.

A.G. Pilsudski played a part that seldom falls to the lot of a politician. Something of the kind can be said of Winston Churchill's role in Britain during the second world war. Pilsudski played the role of a symbol. Every mass movement must have a symbol in which its aspirations are personified. Pilsudski had all the necessary qualities to become in the mass consciousness a symbol of the struggle for independence. He was exiled to Siberia, involved in the socialist movement, arrested by the German authorities, and commanded the first Polish brigade during the 1914-18 war. He was a man persecuted by all the occupation authorities alike, a military and political leader directly connected with the liberation movement.

There were other prominent leaders too, as for instance, Roman Dmowski. It was, however, Pilsudski who, on returning from German captivity in 1918, became a symbol of the struggle for Polish revival. He was backed by the right and the left. I am not speaking here of the Communists who held an entirely different position on the question of Polish independence, remaining advocates of a European and world revolution and opponents of the establishment of bourgeois states. So not just in the public consciousness but also in the opinion of career politicians, Pilsudski was a figure who could promote national unity.

A.G. In general, he was a legendary figure.

N.T. In this precisely lies the role he played in the gaining of national independence and the building of the Polish state. Of course historians should establish how well-founded the legend was. We are talking about a social phenomenon, and a legend has always been a social phenomenon.

N.T. Recalling the eventful history of Poland, one cannot but agree with the judgement often repeated by the Poles themselves that the history of their country is one of missed opportunities. One might also recall a well-known axiom: one must learn from the lessons of history in order to avoid repeating mistakes. What have the Poles learned from their history today, in the present difficult political and economic situation? Can history teach us anything?

A.G. That reminds me of the statement that "history teaches us life." I do not agree. History is not a chain of analogies, repetitions and coincidences. It is impossible to draw straightforward conclusions from it. History can only teach us that there are no simple decisions, causes or consequences directly ensuing from them.

N.T. I understand that it is not the business of historians to predict social and political processes. Nevertheless, I shall venture to ask how you, a specialist in the recent history of Poland, assess the significance and prospects of something that is now being debated a great deal. I have in mind the round-table discussions between representatives of different political forces and orientations.

A.G. I shall answer not as an expert but, first of all, as a citizen of Poland, and only partly as a historian. It becomes clear sometimes that you cannot follow the old road, because all the possibilities have been exhausted, and if there is a desire to go forward new ways should be promptly sought. However, courage is needed for that. Experience shows that considerable social processes have a great force of inertia. If something begins to rot, it does not disappear immediately. The process can take years. But then treatment becomes more expensive with every passing year, while recovery becomes less likely.

I think that Poland and the Soviet Union are in identical situations, though there are specific distinctions. It is important, however, that Poland and the Soviet Union have come to the same conclusion: the old methods of government and the functioning of society have simply become obsolete, and it is impossible to advance along the old road.

As for our round-table discussions, it is naive to think that the ailing organism of Poland will recover on a given date. It will be a long process, and complications, dramatic moments and relapses are not to be ruled out. But it seems to me that there is a genuine desire on the part of the majority to reach a positive result. This inspires optimism. But it is not the rosy optimism of a man who believes that in a couple of months' time we shall be comfortably off and love each other.

Interviewer **Rudolf BORECKI**
WARSAW

The Lysenko phenomenon

In May of this year a joint decision of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, the Academy of Medical Sciences and the Agricultural Academy set up a committee to study the history of genetics in the Soviet Union. One of the tasks of the committee is to assess the damage that "People's Academician" Lysenko and his henchmen inflicted on Soviet science.

Deputy Chairman of the Committee, Doctor of Chemistry **Alexei SHAMIN** spoke of some of the Committee's findings to New Times observer Lev Yelin.

Why has the committee been set up today, twenty-five years after Lysenko's downfall? Was it the wish of the Academies to fill in the blank spots in their history in the wake of the general tendency, or are there more profound reasons?

The reasons are numerous...We must tell the whole truth of the conditions under which genetics and biology in general have developed in this country. It's time we gave a clear-cut answer: was the Lysenko phenomenon an isolated occurrence, or is it typical of the Soviet science in general? It is imperative that we should reveal not only the scientific, but also the political, economic and social prerequisites that made possible Lysenko's dominance in science. Our task is not just to analyze the past; we want to make sure that this past is not worming its way into the present and will not be possible in future...

Hence my first question – what helped Lysenko get to the top?

Here I'd like to say that Lysenko had a precursor – Academician Williams, from whom he borrowed many of his infamous methods of running down his scientific rivals. Lysenko first appeared in the late 1920s, when Williams was already demanding capital punishment for those who dared pursue theories different from his own, even without criticizing Williams himself, as was the case with A. Doyarenko. After Lysenko had secured his position, he joined forces with Williams: the very term "agrobiology" was born of this alliance.

However, the main thing is that in the late 1920s and early 1930s the Lysenko phenomenon was vastly assisted by the confluence of several political, economic and social factors. Our press is now giving extensive coverage to the grim political situation at the time. Economic conditions were no better: the crop failures of the late 1920s had been exacerbated by the grave immediate consequences of the collectivization drive, and the country was experiencing food shortages. The switchover from small-scale commodity production to large collective farms required a new farming technique. In this context, anyone who offered new methods and pledged to boost output by introducing new varieties of plants and more productive livestock breeds evidently stood to gain, and was given priority. Lysenko emerged as a talented, energetic expert from the faraway southern Azerbaijan, always prepared to offer breathtaking perspectives. All that earned him the support of serious scientists, including Vavilov...

Still, the decisive factor in Lysenko's rise must have been support at the top. The history of this country knows of many cases where the leadership seized at any innovation promising immediate profit without thinking twice about longer-term consequences.

We tend to simplify the Lysenko phenomenon, saying it was an offshoot of the personality cult, or that Lysenko himself enjoyed the favour of Stalin and successive People's Commissars for Agriculture. Behind Lysenko there were certain interest groups, first of all practical agriculturists, who badly needed state-of-the-art techniques. They believed in Lysenko; he had made a brilliant career: corresponding member of the Agricultural Academy, Academician, President of the Academy. They sincerely believed that results would not be slow in coming.

Could you remind our readers of one of Lysenko's "curative" measures?

In the late 1930s, the People's Commissariat for Agriculture put forward the idea of an integrated seed-farming system. This system was a priority task, pivotal for the development of agriculture. A special committee headed by Vavilov was set up, and Vavilov propounded a brilliant and practicable prog-

ramme. By that time, however, Lysenko had become powerful enough to dissolve the Vavilov committee, declare its programme invalid and advance a methodology of his own. The implementation of the Lysenko scheme resulted in the virtual destruction of seed-farming in this country. What Lysenko offered seemed attractive – he spoke of adapting some varieties of plant through changing heredity. This scheme forced agriculturists into the illusory belief that they were capable of tackling the problem on their own, without a centralized programme. On the other hand, the nation's leadership indulged in the idea that a very costly seed-farming system, requiring rigid control, was not really necessary, since matters could take care of themselves. The idea was attractive – and disastrous.

Another classic example of Lysenko's no less destructive activities was his campaign against maize inzucht-hybrids which, when introduced in the United States, yielded a thirty-per cent increase in grain output, amounting in the mid-50s to some 15 billion pouds. (A Russian unit of weight equal to about 36.11 pounds.) Even this year we purchased grain from these hybrids in the United States...

The appeal of such "practical" slogans could have weakened with time, and by the mid-30s Lysenko was already trying to identify scientific opposition with ideological and philosophical deviation. "The Party principle" in science became an instrument of repression, and "dissident" scientists were labeled counter-revolutionaries. The division of science (and not just science) into "ours" and "alien," to which we have unfortunately become accustomed, proved fertile soil for bloody speculations...

"We have grown accustomed..." In fact, comparisons between Soviet and "bourgeois" science originated in the philosophical discussions of the 20s, but Lysenko's sinister part was in the fact that he spared no effort to make this comparison seem natural and to bring ideology to science. Scientific criteria were replaced by ideological ones...

By the 1940s Lysenko had defeated his opponents. What price did the Soviet science pay for this "victory"?

Lysenko's "victory" was built on administrative and Party leverage, which meant arrest and death for many...

By the 1940s he had no opponent of the scale of Vavilov or Koltsov, who founded the Institute of Experimental Biology and was its first director. Neither did he fear any attacks "from the flank." Irreparable damage had been inflicted on agricultural economics by the annihilation of Chayanov and his school; advocates of mathematical methods in ecology had been routed as a result of the victimization of Stanchinsky, one of the founding fathers of modern ecology, and the dismissal of Nemchinov (an outstanding economist and statistician) from the office of President of the Timiryazev Farming Academy; agronomy was destroyed after Tulaikov's arrest and execution by firing squad and the death of Pryanishnikov.

The principal damage perpetrated by Lysenko and his henchmen must be recognized in the destruction of the Soviet school of genetics, the termination of promising scientific studies and the closure of a number of research centres. The development of anthropogenetics and medical genetics in this country was halted, as was that of some branches of experimental and theoretical biology, which in the 50s gave world science such productive and promising disciplines as molecular biology and molecular genetics.

The teaching of biology also received a hard blow: fully aware that his doctrines would eventually be debunked by a new generation of well-educated biologists, even in the 30s Lysenko had demanded that "Mendelism-Morganism" be excluded from the biology syllabus.

Agriculture was crippled. Time, money and scientific effort were squandered on obviuosly useless research; unprofitable and unscientific recommendations and ventures were foisted on agriculture by decree, resulting in losses costing millions. Even today the nation's economy has not recovered from Lysenko's experiments.

After the war Lysenko's position was shaken. Biology journals showered criticism on him, while hopes of practical results grew threadbare. Finally, in 1948, Y. Zhdanov, Head of the Department of Science of the Party's Central Committee, and son of a prominent Stalinist ideologue, Politbureau Member A. Zhdanov, , denounced the unscientific theories and baseless promises of the "People's Academician." Lysenko's world seemed about to come crashing down. However, he again managed to get off unscathed, and a new rise began. One more "Lysenko phenomenon"?

There were a variety of reasons for the new rise, especially Stalin's support for Lysenko after the latter launched his complaint against Zhdanov, well aware of the fact that criticism was lethal for the structure he had created. Then came the notorious session of the Agricultural Academy of July 31-August 7, 1948, which excluded the remotest possibility of coexistence between conventional biology and the "Michurinist agrobiology" of Lysenko. In his concluding speech at the session Lysenko said: "I was asked about the attitude of the Party's Central Committee to my report. My answer is: the Central Committee has considered my report and approved it." On the same day Pravda carried Y. Zhdanov's letter to Stalin in which he retracted his criticism of Lysenko. All that implied that "Michurinist biology" had become the official Party line and that any deviations from it were incompatible with Party membership. Lysenko's theories were recognized everywhere, followed by mass dismissals. Reshuffles rocked the biology branch of the Academy of Sciences. Many laboratories were closed down, and a number of scientific schools ransacked.

In my opinion, Stalin supported Lysenko because of the need to maintain the state of affairs that had been reached before the war and was considerably damaged after it. Stalin did not want any drastic changes capable of undermining his authoritarian policies and administrative methods of management in any of branches of national life, science included. This was all the more so because by that time science had begun to turn into a powerful factor that could prove dangerous to the system (we had entered the Nuclear Age, and the role of science in the economy had grown substantially).

The Soviet nuclear programme evidently did not suffer from anything akin to the Lysenko phenomenon. In this case common sense prevailed... Still, the solution of agricultural problems in a country ravaged by war was no less important. In this case, why wasn't science protected?

We hope to find answers in the work which still lies ahead. Much of the past remains unclear. What is clear though, is the fact that Stalin's support was decisive in Lysenko's career. However, this support wouldn't have been vouchsafed if Lysenko had not had certain influential social circles behind him. Unlike the 30s, when his ideas appealed to agronomists who were begging for help, in the post-war years Lysenko was backed by a powerful group of bureaucrats which he himself had nurtured. To be more precise, this group had been generated by the Lysenko system. There were many people in the administrative and Party apparatus who owed their careers to Lysenko. These functionaries constituted the broth for Lysenko, they formed the "public opinion." In physics and chemistry, the positions of adherents of command methods in science were not as strong as in biology.

After Stalin's death, Khrushchev was courageous enough to denounce the personality cult from the rostrum of a Party congress. How could it be that Lysenko, a product of the person-

Trofim Lysenko addressing a conference of front-rank agricultural workers and Party and government leaders in December 1935. On the right is Joseph Stalin

ality cult, a model Stalinist, again fitted in well?

It was not that simple at all... 297 outstanding biologists, among them Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences Baranov and Academician Dubinin, wrote a letter calling on the Central Committee to end the Lysenko-generated system. There was another letter by 24 leading physicists, chemists and economists (Kapitsa, Sakharov, Tamm, Ginzburg, Landau and others). This valiant act did not go unnoticed, and Lysenko started to lose credibility. Soviet schools of genetics were gradually restored and research centres reopened. Then... It should be borne in mind that the situation in the country was virtually unchanged: agriculture needed to be rebuilt after the damage inflicted on it during the last years of Stalin's rule and as a result of the ill-considered moves of the new leadership. In this context, Khrushchev, guided by the as yet unclear personal motives, refused to dump Lysenko, supported him and allowed to express his ideas at the 20th Party Congress, which was unprecedented since Lysenko was not a Party member. Fortunately, in Khrushchev's time Lysenko's comeback could not entail the annihilation of opponents or the ransackiong of laboratories. On the contrary, new research centres continued to grow, and opposition to Lysenko increased. In 1956 Lysenko resigned from the office of President of the Agricultural Academy, but he was still supported at the top. It seems that in 1961 Lysenko used his influence to oust Nesmeyanov, the then President of the Academy of Sciences. In August 1961 he again became President of the Agricultural Academy, though on April 5, 1962, he resigned due to his "deteriorating state of health." Only in 1964, after the October plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, the destroyed branches of Soviet biology were reinstated.

Little is known of Lysenko's life after that...

After the plenary meeting Lysenko was dismissed from the post of Director of the Institute of Genetics, which he had occupied since the time of Vavilov's arrest in 1940. He remained head of a research farm in Gorki Leninskie, near Moscow, where he continued his experiments, refusing to leave science for good. In 1976 Lysenko died...

Lysenko robbed Soviet science of 30 years of development, though not he alone of course, and under very specific conditions. Still, the phenomenon is alarming...

Lysenko did colossal damage to Soviet science. In the 1920s and 1930s genetics in the Soviet Union was in the vanguard of science, and Soviet biology led the world. For example, we say that genetics was founded by Morgan. However, it was in Russia that Chetverikov created genetics of populations, which opened up perspectives for its practical application and was a powerful theory in itself. Many outstanding discoveries were made in the Soviet Union. The American scientist Muller started his research in genetics, which later won him the Nobel Prize, at the Koltsov institute...

Worst of all, Lysenko disrupted traditional agricultural practices, thus cancelling out the centuries-old experience of the Russian peasantry.

Today we speak much about openness in research work, about the need for closer scientific contacts. This could be another guarantee against the return of the Lysenko phenomenon. It is hardly, by the way, that Vavilov eagerly awaited the Seventh International Congress scheduled to take place in Moscow in 1937, and that Lysenko went out of his way to sabotage it...

As I have already said, all discussions concerning biology and genetics were held among practicians. For Vavilov and his supporters the Congress seemed the only way to address likeminded scientists, capable of understanding and duly appraising their efforts. The Congress could have provided Vavilov with the support of the world scientific community, but the Congress was rendered abortive and never took place. Some members of the organizing committee were arrested, and Lysenko exploited the fact to the full... However, after 1948 the Lysenkoites understood the importance of international contacts and started to make their way into the world arena. Glushchenko, one of Lysenko's most ardent disciples, read his papers abroad to full houses. Students and scientists thronged to listen to him: for them Glushchenko's reports sounded as though someone had started to question the Copernican model of the world, defending that of Ptolemy before present-day congress of astronomers... This didn't prevent Glushchenko from interpreting it as an immense interest on the part of the Western scientific community in Lysenko's innovations...

In the West many of those who studied the Lysenko phenomenon, in particular David Joravsky in his book, "The Lysenko Affair," maintain that such occurrences are inherent in the socialist model of society, that they will keep appearing again and again, though under different conditions and on a different scale. What do you think of that?

I can't agree with these assertions. Closer to the truth, to my mind, are works by Soviet sociologists, particularly those by Academician Zaslavskaya, who says that in any society there will always exist social groups with their own specific interests.

The situation has changed dramatically and today the rise of a new Lysenko is hardly possible. But there might still appear social and economic conditions in which certain groups (perhaps draped in respectable academic robes) could try to revive administrative methods in science and introduce ideological or other unscientific forms of evaluation of work in natural sciences. This is quite feasible, although any precise imitations of the Lysenko phenomenon are doomed to failure, since the development of our society has excluded this possibility.

We hope that the findings of our committee will help to prevent another Lysenko phenomenon, whatever form it might assume...

The committee has just started its work. We are interested in the fate of every scientist, every laboratory and shall appreciate all evidence that could prove useful in our efforts.

Our address: U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences Institute of the History of Natural Sciences and Technology, Staropansky Lane 1/5, Moscow, U.S.S.R., 103012.

JUNIOR WORLD

A breeding ground for thoughtless ruffians?

Why discuss school all the time? The rubric, after all, is Junior World, not Problems at School. Is there nothing else in the life of our youth that deserves our attention?

There is, no doubt, a host of other themes. But let us take a look at what conditions the character of the average child. The factors are: heredity, the family, school, peers, books, TV, the cinema and the theatre... And last but not least, the life of society.

Many parents whose children become immoral or even delinquent as they grow up, deny their responsibility. They blame "the system," closing their eyes to the fact that under one and the same "system," some couples have normal children, while others have nothing but trouble with their offspring. Even the most sober-minded of adults usually become moralizing when it comes to speaking about pedagogical problems; they tell you with an expert's air that the family is very important, the cinema is very important, the theatre is very important, because these things decide (!) the child's destiny.

True, everything – the streets, cinema, theatre, etc. – is of great importance. But if we sincerely want to make our children's life kinder and more interesting, let us consider how much say we have in matters relating to the upbringing of children in our own country.

There's no longer any point in emphasizing the importance of the family. It's about time we should stop using classical aphorisms on the role of the family in socialist society as epigraphs to any article about family relations. What we really need is to educate parents. But we have so far achieved pathetically little in this respect. The lecturers hardly know what sort of practical knowledge they should communicate to their audiences. Few people come to a second lecture.

Today, society's ability to influence the domestic upbringing of children is negligible, and it will take many years to make it considerable. Delinquent juvenile groups have long been an acute problem, but nobody seems to know how to deal with them. It is naive, to put it mildly, to keep hoping that some good and serious boys will come to inspire others with socially useful activity. Books? But whoever can name at least one new book that teenagers are crazy about? We haven't seen such a book in thirty years or more!

Yes, everything is important, but nothing is as important as school. And school is indeed something that the general public can influence. This too of course is extremely difficult; many even think that the school system is past redemption. The chief result of the numerous attempts at school reform is that our society seems to have given it up as a bad job. For example, when the problem of so-called "street wars" is discussed, people come up with all manner of unrealistic ideas, but they steer clear of mentioning school. Nobody pins any hopes on it, as though it doesn't exist.

Time and again one hears somebody say: "The period of school education should be reduced, because it's useless anyway!" The reader A. Bobkov writes in his letter to the Sovetskaya Kultura newspaper: "Schools are just breeding grounds for thoughtless ruffians. Only the first four forms should be compulsory, after which pupils should be free to leave. Do you say half the population will be illiterate? But it's already illiterate – their school-leaving certificates aren't worth a curse!"

A forceful statement reflecting a fairly common sentiment? If one cared to thumb at random through a few of the latest periodicals, one would find that the authors writing about school problems craftily paper over the root causes of the continuing stagnation in school affairs. As a rule, their articles begin with describing a certain disaster at school and end with the moth-eaten "where were the teachers?" But nobody wants to intercede for our school, to "fight" for it.

When the school reform was first announced, it met with nationwide enthusiasm and became the subject of hot debates. Headings of the Reform in Action type were to be found in every newspaper. On TV, ministerial officials were promising that the reform would make fast progress, they were assessing in all seriousness the prospects of using helicopters to take computers to far-off rural schools.

But the euphoria was followed by a hangover. Today the media holds its tongue.

A commission for the restructuring of the pedagogical academy has been set up, its members upholding concepts that are poles apart. The results? Judging by reports in the press, those whom we have come to regard as champions of perestroika stay away from discussions. Probably they just don't want to have anything to do with their opponents. In the meantime, aficionados of the good old Academy vigorously defend their "cause," and with pretty good chances to win, while silence reigns around.

When the Union of Cooperators came into being, all the papers covered the event. Not so with the teachers' union, which is being set up with tremendous difficulty, coming up against countless obstacles. But the press keeps silent. Or are they just waiting till the union is endorsed from above?

Two different concepts of school were published recently, each setting the general course for years ahead, but nobody has so far given himself the trouble of analyzing them in any detail. Clearly, we are sick and tired of discussions.

But if school indeed becomes a breeding ground for thoughtless ruffians, what will happen to perestroika and the entire nation?

Once in a while I get telephone calls from my long-time acquaintances. I often anticipate their problems. The teacher has taken a dislike to the acquaintance's child or grandchild. They ask me to help them find a better school. Alas, is there a better school?

How long shall we keep putting up with it? To begin restructuring school education without the slightest delay is absolutely essential.

Simon Soloveichik

Natalia Ilyina's article "The Revenant," printed in a recent issue of the magazine Ogonyok, could be ranked on the strength of its soundness and wealth of hitherto unknown information as a scholarly work, were it not written with the satirical brilliance so characteristic of the author.

Natalia Ilyina talks about the little known Russian Fascist Party which was active in the 1930s on the territory of Manchuria, then occupied by the Japanese.

Natalia Ilyina, the daughter of Russian émigrés who grew up in Harbin, has firsthand knowledge of the crude fascists. At 22 she moved from provincial Harbin to Shanghai, where she was taken onto the staff of the newspaper Shanghai Dawn as a reporter. Presently, in 1939, she became a publisher of the émigré magazaine Shankhaisky Bazar. In those years she made friends with the celebrated Alexander Vertinsky and contributed stories to the pro-Soviet newspaper Novaya Zhizn.

In 1948, like a great many other émigrés, she returned home to the Soviet Union. She lived in Kazan and earned her living as a shorthand typist. In the autumn of 1948 she entered the Literary Institute and became a regular contributor to the Krokodil satirical magazine. Natalia Ilyina is the author of the novel "Homecoming" and the book of reminiscences entitled "Lines of Life." Satire remains her favourite genre, however.

Only recently the population of the tiny princedom of Liechtenstein marked the golden anniversary of **Franz Josef II**, Europe's longest reigning monarch (though of course Emperor Hirohito of Japan so far holds the world record of 62 years of rule). A special memorial plaque with the marble profile of the 82-year-old sovereign was affixed to the wall of the ducal palace in Vaduz to mark the event.

Four years ago the duke officially handed over executive power to his son, Crown Prince Hans Adam. Despite a history of wars and other upheavals from the Middle Ages to today, the duchy of Liechtenstein, a splinter of the Holy Roman Empire, (with the territory of 157 square kilometres, and a population of only 30,000) has managed to retain its independence. The ducal family has the controlling interest in the prosperous Liechtensteinische Landesbank, which has branches in

New York, Zurich, London and Frankfort on the Main, and also owns two palaces in Vienna and vast farmlands in the U.S. The extremely rich art collection started in the 17th century is rightly considered as its principal treasure.

Today this collection of paintings, sculpture, carpets, tapestries, arms and armour and antique furniture is housed in the restricted premises of one of the massive towers of the eight-century old ducal castle in Vaduz. The collection includes masterpieces by Raphael, Van Dyck, Cranach and Pieter Brueghel. Just before the second world war Franz Josef managed to get most of his collection out of the Palais Liechtenstein in Vienna to Vaduz before the nazis were able to seize it. There have been times when the collection rescued the dynasty from financial disaster: in the 1960s a Leonardo da Vinci was sold for a fabulous sum to the National Gallery in Washington.

Franz Josef and the Crown Prince are planning to build a new museum to open the collection to the public. But as there is little vacant space in the capital of this tiny state, a project is being discussed to construct a subterranean gal-

Born at the turn of the century

A participant in the Great October Socialist Revolution, **Konstantin Sinozersky**, 88, was seventeen when he stormed the Winter Palace. For as long as 71 years he has been in the ranks of the Soviet Communists. Too few such long-standing Party veterans are still with us.

Konstantin Sinozersky, a contemporary of the century, was born in Petrograd into a worker's family. In 1917 on the personal recommendation of Kalinin, he joined the ranks of the Bolshevik Party and had the opportunity to see Lenin in Smolny. All of Konstantin Sinozersky's subsequent career was associated with Party work: in the mid-1920s he was in the Far East, in 1930 he worked as secretary of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast Party Committee in Pamir, in 1932 he was first Party organizer of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) CC at the Baikal-Amur Railroad project. During the Great Patriotic War he was commissar of a regiment, then of a division, and served in the General Staff. In 1945 Konstantin Sinozersky again found himself in the Far East, together with General Derevyanko, who accepted Japan's capitulation on behalf of the Soviet government.

In 1956 Konstantin Sinozersky retired. A new life opened up before him as a journalist and public figure.

A Merited Cultural Worker of the Russian Federation, he has been working for more than 27 years without pay as dean of the television faculty and prorector of the Maria Ulyanova Worker Correspondents University in Moscow and chairs the council of assistance for the Central Museum of the Revolution of the U.S.S.R.

"Our lives stand behind each phase of socialist construction, and yet it is necessary to make a profound and critical analysis of the past. Perestroika is the hope and faith of the people," Konstantin Sinozersky believes.

It is important for us to realize today that the current revolutionary changes in our society are supported by those who 71 years ago raised the banner of the October Revolution.

Konstantin Sinozersky's great granddaughter is fifteen, so four generations of the Sinozersky family are contributing to perestroika.

M. Shakina

lery beneath the vineyards that grace the hillsides of Vaduz and which are also part of ducal possessions.

The female disc jockey contest held for the first time in the Soviet Union at the Moscow youth association Prospekt brought success to **Natalya Alekseyeva.** She defeated several dozens of her rivals who had made up their minds to "master" this purely male occupation. Each contestant was given 15 minutes in which to improvise to show to best advantage her ability to perform on the stage and make contact with the audience.

"Though I am only 21, I have tried my hand at many occupations," Natalya Alekseyeva says, "working as a hunter in forestry, looking after animals in the circus and the zoo, and as a charwoman in the theatre. I visit discotheques once in a while. I don't like them as they

are. One should vary the programme, inserting pieces of classical music and rock compositions, which are much more emotional than monotonous disco.

"To my mind, the routine style of disc-jockeying, impersonal and cheerleaderish, is out of date as well. The disc jockey should give everyone the opportunity to have his or her say and feel himself a personality if only at the discotheque."

In a month Natasha will again appear on the Prospekt stage, but this time as a regular disc jockey.

Writer **Menyhert Lakatos,** 62, is chairman of the Hungarian Gypsies' Cultural Association, which was formed in June 1986. The Association is the only European organization founded to develop and protect the interests of the Gypsy national minority whose number in Hungary stands at half a million (it is the largest ethnic minority in the country). Two years ago the Association launched its own newspaper Romano Nyevipe. The newspaper interviewed Karoly Grosz, General Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, who admitted that racial hatred seemed to be on the increase in Hungary, manifesting itself, among other things, in anti-semitism and a hostile attitude to the Gypsies. These repugnant phenomena damage Hungary's prestige in



the international arena, he pointed out. "Without an adequate solution to the Gypsy question, our country will not be able to carry out the modernization of the economy, and morally it will not be able to rank as a European country," said Grosz.

Menyhert Lakatos was born in Bekes region in the Gypsy village of Veszto. His father was illiterate, and his mother only had primary education. Twenty years ago he published his first novel, "Smoky Pictures." On its heels followed other books – "They Who Want to Live" and "Csandra's Carriage." For the past two years Menyhert Lakatos has contributed all his efforts to his work in the Cultural Association and has therefore had too little time for writing. Yet he is reflecting on two projects: the story "The Good Soldier" set at the time of World War I, and "Seven Lives of Kali," an attempt to give an account of the Gypsy people's history, from the remote past to the present day and the problems of adapting to modern society.

"The stratum of Gypsy intellectuals in Hungary is very small," says Menyhert Lakatos. "Prosperity for our people is out of the question when the bulk of it is holding us back. Half a million Gypsies are an enormous reserve work force, and application for it should be found somewhere.

"Though our organization is classified as a cultural association, we do not shrink from economic initiatives either. We would like, for example, to buy and restore the brick factory at Tiszabercel. It would help to employ several hundreds of Gypsies.

Janos Juhani Nagy
BUDAPEST

Who fails to hear Zvuki MU?

e artistic style of **Pyotr monov,** 37, a soloist in the l-known Moscow pop-up Zvuki MU, whose perance has so far been too ch for any TV studio in our ntry, produces a surprising pression on the untrained and eye of the audience. at Mamonov does is, unestionably, realistic art. But confuses the real and the eal in his songs so much some listeners cannot dit the performance of the up, to the astonishment of ers who are fanatically deated to their idols.

Realism is life, every day of life, but one day looks like pressionism, another like ealism, yet another like errealism," says monov. "To do something thwhile, one should live one's soul open. I think underestimate rock; it's a musical genre, it's a new

Zvuki MU's sudden realism, expressed in serious and unusual texts as well as in Mamonov's incredible sense of rhythm, so impressed authorities in one city last year that they offered the group a down payment for the concerts if they left without performing. When the group refused, the authorities banned the second concert...

Each Zvuki MU's programme proves so unlike what has gone before that Mamonov's and his musicians' fans are waiting for "the spring to dry up." But the group's resourcefulness seems bottomless. Unfortunately, the passion for self-perfection has not so far allowed them to complete the album rock fans and, apparently, Melodia are looking forward to.

Pyotr Mamonov was a success playing a negative part in Rashid Nugmanov's film "The Needle." But the same role, which bureaucrats construed to be autobiographical, put up obstacles in the way of the Zvuki MU musicians in making it to television.

E. Brandman

Man can live longer

The following is an interview with biologist Dr **FATIMA ATA-MURADOVA** on the study of the human brain

The human brain is a "black box" whose secrets have barely been fathomed to this day. True, the blank spots in the scientific knowledge about this important human organ have been dealt with liberally in literature.

Recall this passage: "Biting his lip, Filip Filippovich began drilling holes one centimetre apart in Sharik's skull..." Now wait a minute, any reader familiar with the works of Mikhail Bulgakov might say: "That passage is from 'The Heart of a Dog'. It's not about a human being, it's about a dog." So it is, but it is also about how the skill of a surgeon transformed the dog into a human being. Flights of fantasy sometimes become the reality. So far, regrettably, we have not yet witnessed such unique operations as that described by Bulgakov in his story written in the 1920s.

The brain has always been regarded as something sacrosanct. For centuries man has shied away from the very thought of probing it for fear of being deprived of the faculty of independent thought, the ability to control his behavior so as not to become a mere robot.

"Yes, you are quite right," Dr Fatima Ata-Muradova, head of the Systems Genesis and genetics group of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences Institute of General Genetics, said. "To convince everyone that the brain is just another organ of the human body and that it too sometimes needs surgical intervention is one of our basic tasks."

But before operating, it is essential, of course, thoroughly to study, work out and verify the methods to be used. For sometimes the most sophisticated operations can be performed by relatively simple means, as is done, for example, in Fatima Ata-Muradova's laboratory where transplants of a certain part of the brain are performed in animals.

Now a little background information. As far back as the 1930s, German researchers transferred the medullary plate, the foundation of the future nervous system, from the spawn of Rana terrestris frog to that of Pelobates-fucsus. The hatched Pelobates fucsus began to dig itself into the ground, in other words, a transplantation of behavior had occurred.

"We adopted the same technique," Fatima Ata-Muradova said, "to transplant the embryonal human brain. Operations of this kind have already been performed on mice and rabbits. Rabbits have also been given transplants of the cortical optic area. Observation of the operated animals revealed a greatly accentuated sensitivity to flashes of light. This was encouraging, the more so that the surgical technique involved was rather simple: embryonal cells of a part of the brain in a nutritive medium are introduced by dropper into another brain."

Do such transplanted cells thrive?

Perfectly well. Thanks to two factors: first, we transplant embryonal tissue in which the genes are still inactive, and secondly, the brain itself reacts very well to such intervention.

What is the purpose of such operations? Could they serve to prolong human life?

At first we merely wanted to see how the immunity system would respond to a transplant of the hypothalamus – its "control panel," so to speak. The gerontological aspect was a later development. The point is that it is precisely the hypothalamus that determines the viability of the entire immunity system. It is the "immunity brain," so to speak, of the organism. The brain in the ordinary sense exercises control through the nerves, the nervous system, whereas the "immunity brain" does so through "messengers" – the blood, the lymph, the tissue fluid. In individuals of a degenerating population of mice we had, we replaced the old hypothalamus with embryonal. The results were astonishing: such vital glands as the spleen, the thymus and the liver increased in size, and our mice became more active. But the main thing was that they lived to the age of three years, while the average life span of a mouse is one and a half to two years!"

But was there not something strange about their behavior?

No, in such operations there is no transplantation of behaviour. It might be another story if we had operated at an embryonal level, i.e., if we had transplanted a small part of an embryonal brain which can develop also a hypothalamus, a thymus and a hypophysis... The cells we transplant have their own precise inbuilt functions which they will perform only in their allotted place. This might be compared to the situation when a working collective is joined by a new member; while he does of course bring something new with him, he nevertheless in time becomes part of the general, well-ordered system. Of course, behavior might change if a quarter of the cerebral hemisphere were to be transplanted, but no one proposes to do that to human beings.

Then it is impossible to transplant a complete human brain?

A person lives only so long as his brain lives. The brain cannot be revived. But to transplant even an embryonal brain or a cerebral hemisphere would be an extremely complicated undertaking. At present we merely implant a minute part of it, after which it adapts, organizes itself, being as it is an ingenious self-regulating system. Even if the embryonal tissue falls into the wrong place, it will move to where it belongs and eventually occupy its proper place.

The cerebral hemispheres are connected by a vast nerve and vascular network. The mature brain is already trained, it knows its own immunity system and will certainly not accept a foreign body. It is here that the rejection begins. The embryonal implant will begin to adapt to the conditions in which it has been transplanted. It is as if a European child placed among pygmies became a pygmy itself, retaining only the colour of his skin.

When a tumour is removed from a brain the resultant cavity is filled with a connective tissue and the result can be a serious case of epilepsy, for example. But if the cavity is filled with embryonal tissue the latter will grow and begin to function in harmony with its environment. But obviously you cannot take any embryonal implant at random and arbitrarily implant it in any part of the brain. An embryonal optic cortical area implant has to go into

the same area and a subcortex implant, into the subcortex."

So your operations are a universal panacea?

Of course not, but they are applicable in a wide range of cases. True, there is still a debate going on about whether brain transplants are permissible from the humane standpoint. But after all, we are speaking of people who suffer from congenital and acquired afflictions, people whose lives depend sometimes on artificial hearts, lungs or kidneys. Our humanism does not allow of their being deprived of these aids, but life under such conditions is sheer agony. For such patients any new method capable of improving their condition is a blessing.

Take Parkinson's disease for example. Some 15 years ago an attempt was made in Sweden to treat it by transplanting parts of the brain. But Parkinsonism is a disease of the entire nervous system and hence it is the "control panel" that has to be changed. You implant new cells and they begin to function against the background of the old, just as new shoots sprung up next to the withering boughs of an ancient oak. The importnat thing is to act while the cells are still alive and rejuvenation is possible.

At the present time the reanimators have only a few minutets in which to bring back a patient from a state of clinical death. As far as I know, the body can be reanimated after several hours, but not the brain. If the cortex dies the patient dies. Would the use of your method of transplantation change the situation?

Implant young cells in order to stimulate the old? It would indeed be interesting to transplant embryonal tissue to prolong life.

Perhaps then it would be necessary to supply the reanimation teams with precious cell material?

Yes, such a transplant could be used in any branch of medicine. The embryonal brain will always grow and adapt itself, for the organism is a living integral system. Today, for instance, artificial valves are used in cardiac surgery, but synthetic materials are neutral whereas the live always interact with the living. I believe that in the future it will become possible to develop organ engineering, primarily for the newly-born.

If the hypothalamus is the "control centre" of the immunity system, could hypothalamus transplantation not help to get rid of AIDS, which is primarily a matter of a lowered immunity?

That is one of the proposals we have made. In AIDS patients it is the "control centre" that is affected, but it is possible that if it is replaced, the organism will be able to cope with the disease. Though of course, surgical intervention in the treatment of any disease is a last resort. We believe that hypothalamus and bone marrow transplants could help in the case fo leukemia or radiation sickness. But all that has to be thoroughly verified.

To return to gerontology. Not long ago your laboratory made an examination of the very old. Could you comment on your findings?

Last summer we went on an expedition to the Talishi, a people living in southern Azerbaijan, to ascertain to what extent longevity depends on the activity of the brain. Prior to this, we had made a study of genetic groups in Moscow and Turkmenia. Ever since the 17th century intermarriage has been the rule among the Talishi. Why, you may ask, do they not suffer from hereditary ailments? Above all because there is no pathological gene, and the purity of the breed is preserved. It is among the Talishi that the highest percentage of instances of extraordinary longevity has been registered, as for instance, Muslimov and Aivazov who lived more than 130 years.

The results of the encephalograms of those exmained revealed a remarkable feature: among the Moscow and Turkmenian groups, who are not noted for longevity, by the age of 50 the trend was distinctly downward, whereas the encephalograms of the Talishi, with slight fluctuations, remained at a high level comparable to that of 15- and 17-year-olds. After examining more than 20 people of over a hundred years of age we were amazed at the "youthfulness" of their encephalograms. This led us to assume that longevity is clearly of genetic origin. Incidentally, the children of the Talishi also show promise of record lifespans.

A man must live out the time allotted him by nature. But you will agree there is comfort in the knowledge that some day we shall be able to defeat old age, the most widespread affliction on earth. At any rate the first step towards victory over old age has been made!

Interviewer Natalya BEKETOVA

Drawing by Alexander Dzhikia

Off the record



Alexander Bovin:
What guarantees can be given against totalitarianism? Only our ability to say "no" and to vote according to conscience...

Alexander Zotov:
The Americans are sure that détente died because of Soviet behavior in regional conflicts....

Leonid Ionin:
The law must prevail over political expediency. Some day we shall reach that point...

In the past this reservation was used by our best speakers before audiences large and small when they were about to express views that differed from the official position. How do matters stand now in this respect?

...Rare today is material that cannot appear in the press. This happens because writers publish things that even the boldest journalist in times gone by would not have risked whispering even "off the record." One should not, though, feel nostalgic on this account. At the same time we can to a certain extent feel the loss of the magic appeal of meetings with the participation of the best journalists where one could expect to hear something shocking.

Therefore the editorial board and the contributors of New Times were pleasantly surprised when on October 27 they arrived at the Moscow House of Political Education to find an appreciative audience who were willing to take part in the discussion of editorial plans for the coming year and to talk about the burning questions of the country's internal life and on Soviet foreign policy. For two hours Alexander Bovin, Leonid Ionin, Simon Soloveichik and Alexander Zotov were offered the opportunity to speak "off the record," though it was clear that they intended to publish in the magazine the bulk of what has been said there.

The audience knows Alexander Bovin well and so he had to answer most of the questions.

"Does the economic reform under way in our country mean that we have at last embarked on the path followed by Yugoslavia and China?"

"Yugoslavia's experience can hardly be described as positive. True, the contents of Moscow shops cannot hold a candle to their Belgrade counterparts. But as the Yugoslavians themselves say, they have everything but money. Runaway inflation, a million unemployed, a flagrant crisis... It would be more accurate to say that we are following the Chinese way. They are two or three years ahead in implementing the economic reform, but their example, however, shows us what we can expect in the immediate future. When enterprises become independent in conditions of deficit economy, prices begin to skyrocket..."

Alexander Zotov, who contributes on the Middle East to New Times, received questions that revealed our readers' displeasure at the coverage of international affairs.

"What happened in South Yemen in January 1986 and what is the reason for the conflicting reports in the Soviet press on this subject? Why do you give so little coverage to the internal situation in Iran and Iraq? What about the Kurd question?"

Two years after the bloody coup attempt in Aden, people still wonder why the whole truth cannot be told? As for Iran, for example, as accurate as possible a picture of the Islamic revolution could be given.

"All these questions stem from the same outstanding problem: all publications of the Soviet press are still perceived as representing the official viewpoint. To avoid major political problems, we had to be so meagre and scrupulous in giving assessments, say, of the Iran-Iraq war," is the opinion of Alexander Zotov.

Judging from the response of the audience, it can be surmised that the persistence of this situation will not please readers.

Simon Soloveichik and Alexander Bovin were greeted by the audience with applause. Soloveichik's articles elicit the most extensive response as letters to the editor flow in. He was asked about the fate of Uchitelskaya Gazeta, what is going on in the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, about the debate about Pavlik Morozov as an example for upbringing. In short, readers demonstrated that they had been attentively reading Soloveichik's feature "Junior World."

The new feature, "A Sociologist's Diary," was presented by its supervisor Leonid Ionin. When he started to talk of his idea of obtaining economic freedoms there came a remark from the floor: "But that is capitalism pure and simple..."

"Let us reason a bit: what is bad about using forms of economic organization that have justified themselves?" Ionin replied. " I am not afraid of the term 'convergence' either, given the mutual penetration and enrichment of cultures and their increased knowledge of each other..."

The audience thought it was they who were asking questions and that New Times' function was to answer them; in actual fact the editorial board also wanted to know the answer to the most important question of whether readers were in favour of the changes going on in New Times, and whether they appreciated the appearance of a large amount of material on humanitarian issues and purely "domestic" problems? Judging from the behaviour of the audience, the response in general is positive... And what do you think, dear reader? What subjects are you most interested in and which authors do you prefer?

Photos by V. Panov

Aristarkh Lentulov. **Peace, Feast, Liberation.** 1917.
From Solomon Shuster's collection

The exhibition features pictures representing two schools of painting – the Bubnovy Valet (Jack of Diamonds), reminiscent of the "fin-de-siecle" French style, and the Golubaya Roza (Blue Rose) – symbolism.

The still lifes by Pyotr Konchalovsky suffused with glowing colours; the ornate decorative compositions by Ilya Mashkov; the exquisite monochrome portraits by Robert Falk; the sun-scorched Kirghizian steppeland in paintings by Pavel Kuznetsov; the dizzying gyration of Sergei Sudeikin's merry-go-rounds; the festive brightness of Nikolai Sapunov's stage sets; the ascetic geometrical patterns by Kazimir Malevich, Alexander Rodchenko, Ivan Puni; the colourful abstracts by Lyubov Popova, Olga Rozanova, Nadezhda Udaltsova; the expressionist everyday life scenes by Natalya Goncharova, Mikhail Larionov, Vladimir and David Burlyuk; all these are different aspects of an art form that held up a mirror to its time.

Alla Gracheva

Lyubov Popova. **Clock.** 1914
From Dmitry Sarabyanov's collection

Avant-garde makes a comeback

Is Russian avant-garde just another passing fad? No, it is a whole world that we have just rediscovered to our own delighted surprise, a world that is overwhelming in its fabulous wealth. We are retrieving from oblivion, bit by bit, the art of half a century ago, of a period which, though brief, can be described as the heyday of Soviet culture. Therefore every new exhibition adds to the well-proportioned edifice rising where there was until recently a tract of wasteland.

Today we present an exhibition entitled "Russian and Soviet Art of 1905-30." The Soviet Cultural Foundation has contributed 107 works from 15 private collections to the show at the Tretyakov Gallery (none of these works has ever been publicly exhibited before). Let us pay tribute to the collectors who have always believed in the sterling value of their treasured possessions and whose faith has been so richly rewarded. They now invite us to partake of their joy.

The exhibition opens with the huge canvas, "Peace, Feast, Liberation" by Aristarkh Lentulov – a hymn to liberated man. One of the leading artists of the Jack of Diamonds group, Lentulov is distinguished by his boisterous palette.

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